



**SM2 Data Centre
165 Williamsons Road
South Morang VIC 3752**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

Preliminary Emergency Response Plan

Prepared for: Legacy Project Management Pty Ltd
Level 3, Suite 3, 108 Power Street
Hawthorn VIC 3122

Prepared by: RED Fire Engineers Pty Ltd

Report No: JV26-00221
Version: V1.2
Date: 1 October 2026



**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**



Document Verification

Document type: Preliminary Emergency Response Plan
Facility: SM2 Data Centre
Type of Facility: Date Centre
Project address: 165 Williamsons Road South Morang VIC 3752
Prepared for: Legacy Project Management Pty Ltd
Prepared by: RED Fire Engineers Pty Ltd
Report No: JV26-00221
Version: V1.2
Date: 1 October 2026

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

Version	Date	Document control		
Draft	1/10/2026	Issue:	Draft Preliminary ERP for stakeholder comments	
		Prepared by:	Reviewed by:	Approved by:
		Name:	[REDACTED]	
			BSc (Mech Eng), FIEAust, CPEng, NER (Fire Safety), FRM-136 5060715, PE0001317 (Fire Safety), FRM-136 4072360, PE0007564 (Fire Safety & Mechanical), RPEQ (Fire Safety) 25594, Certifier – Fire Safety BDC04752, DEP0003184 (Fire Safety Engineer), PRE0001966 (Fire Safety)	(Chem Eng), FIEAust, CPEng, NER (Fire Safety) 5060715, PE0001317 (Fire Safety), FRM-136 (Fire Safety Engineer), RPEQ (Fire Safety) 25594, Certifier – Fire Safety BDC04752, DEP0003184 (Fire Safety Engineer), PRE0001966 (Fire Safety)
V1.2	1/10/2026	Issue:	V1: Minor edits for clarity. Formal issue. V1.1: 31/09/2026 fixing cross reference errors. V1.2: Minor edits for clarity.	
		Prepared By	Reviewed By:	Approved by:
		Name:	[REDACTED]	
				MSc (Fire), BSc (Chem Eng), FIEAust, CPEng, NER (Fire Safety) 5060715, PE0001317 (Fire Safety), FRM-136 (Fire Safety Engineer), RPEQ (Fire Safety) 25594, Certifier – Fire Safety BDC04752, DEP0003184 (Fire



					Safety Engineer), PRE0001966 (Fire Safety)
		Signat ure:			

© RED Fire Engineers Pty Ltd all rights reserved.

RED Fire Engineers has prepared this document for the sole use of the Client and for a specific purpose, each as expressly stated in the document. No other party should rely on this document without the prior written consent of RED Fire Engineers. RED Fire Engineers undertakes no duty, nor accepts any responsibility, to any third party who may rely upon or use this document. This document has been prepared based on the Client's description of its requirements and RED Fire Engineers' experience, having regard to assumptions that RED Fire Engineers can reasonably be expected to make in accordance with sound professional principles. RED Fire Engineers accepts no liability for information provided by the Client and other third parties used to prepare this document or as the basis of the analysis. Subject to the above conditions, this document may be transmitted, reproduced or disseminated only in its entirety.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



Summary of Main Findings and Recommendations

Appointment

RED Fire Engineers Pty Ltd has been appointed by Legacy Project Management Pty Ltd to develop a preliminary Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for the proposed SM2 Data Centre located at 165 Williamsons Road South Morang VIC 3752.

This project involves the development of a new data centre facility. The site consists of 23 data halls. Twelve of these data halls have a floor area of 607.5 m² and IT capacity of 6.8 MW, whilst the remaining have a floor area of 800.75 m² and IT capacity of 9.1 MW.

Purpose and scope

This Preliminary ERP supports the town planning application for the SM2 Data Centre. It addresses only the credible emergency scenarios identified in the accompanying RED Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA): dangerous goods (diesel) fire, deflagration/explosion, battery (LFP) thermal runaway and toxic gas release, and transformer fire. It is a response document that sets out how an emergency, once it occurs, is managed to protect life first, then the environment, then property, and to prevent escalation. It does not address the prevention of emergencies, which is the operator's responsibility through its safety management system.

The purpose of the ERP within the planning package is to demonstrate that the credible emergency scenarios identified in the PHA can be responded to effectively and safely, in coordination with Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV) as the control agency. This Preliminary ERP is an interim document, to be developed into and integrated within a full site Emergency Plan prepared to AS 3745-2010, in consultation with FRV, prior to operation.

Methodology

This ERP has been prepared on the basis of the credible scenarios and control measures established in the SM2 RED PHA report, the emergency-planning framework of AS 3745-2010, and the principal Victorian legislation governing the facility:

- a) Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, No. 107, specifically section 37;
- b) Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 2017, No. 2;
- c) Environment Protection Act 2017;
- d) Environment Protection Regulations 2021;
- e) Dangerous Goods Act 1985, No. 10189, specifically section 28; and
- f) Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022, No. 115, specifically Part 5 — Preparedness for incidents and emergencies, Division 3 - Equipment and planning.

In line with legislation, because diesel storage exceeds the fire-protection quantity under the Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022, written advice must be obtained from the emergency services authority (FRV) in relation to the fire-protection system, and the emergency arrangements are to be developed in consultation with FRV and WorkSafe Victoria. It is expected that this will occur through a Fire Safety Study or similar.



Emergency scenarios addressed

The ERP provides response procedures for the credible scenarios carried forward from the PHA:

- basement bulk and distributed diesel fire (including vertical fuel-riser spread);
- deflagration/explosion from fuel vapour or battery off-gas;
- LFP battery thermal runaway and fire (off-gassing, re-ignition and stranded energy);
- toxic gas release; and oil-filled transformer fire.

Consistent with the PHA, the only hazardous event assessed as having the potential for a significant offsite consequence is a hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas release arising from a battery thermal-runaway event, and even this is assessed as very low likelihood and strongly reduced under any appreciable wind. All other scenarios are assessed as on-site. Response therefore emphasises early detection and isolation, controlled ventilation, defensive firefighting with exclusion zones, containment of contaminated firewater run-off, and downwind awareness for any battery event.

Key findings and recommendations

The credible emergencies at SM2 can be responded to effectively provided the response framework is integrated with the site fire safety systems and with FRV's response capability.

In summary:

The site fire-protection systems (including fire hydrant coverage and water supply) are to be operational and commissioned before batteries are installed or diesel tanks are filled. Pending detailed design, there may be other systems required to be operational prior to these activities, but determining them requires further design development.

Detection and isolation are to enable rapid automatic generator fuel shut-off and battery room/electrical isolation, with automatic escalation to FRV where an event is not actioned promptly. Contaminated firewater run-off is to be contained on site. The operator is to maintain its own operating procedures, safe work method statements, and day-to-day controls to prevent emergencies.

This Preliminary ERP is to be developed into a full Emergency Plan (AS 3745-2010), supported by an Evacuation Plan, an Emergency Services Information Package (ESIP) / Emergency Information Book (EIB), and a Dangerous Goods Manifest, and finalised in consultation with FRV and WorkSafe Victoria prior to operation.

Key Limitations

This preliminary Emergency Response Plan (ERP) has been prepared before the project design has been progressed past a feasibility stage. As such the approach to fire safety systems, means of isolation, and the like are subject to change, particularly in response to the Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) and Fire Safety Study (FSS).

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



Table of Contents

Document Verification	2
Summary of Main Findings and Recommendations	4
Table of Contents	6
Table of Figures.....	7
1 Introduction	8
2 Description of Facility	15
3 Emergency Scenarios (Carried From the PHA)	29
4 Emergency Response Organisation (preliminary)	31
5 Emergency Response Procedures	33
6 Emergency Resources & Infrastructure (indicative)	38
7 Termination, All-Clear & Recovery	39
8 Interfaces & Boundaries.....	40
9 Training, Testing & Review (preliminary).....	41
10 References	42
Appendix-A: Emergency Contact Directory [TBC-Placeholder]	43
Appendix-B: Indicative Site / Emergency Plan [TBC-Placeholder].....	44
Appendix-C: Scenario Response Action Cards [TBC-Placeholder if client develops]	45
Appendix-D: PHA Scenario Cross-Reference.....	46
Appendix E: Control Measures Register (from PHA).....	47
Appendix G: SDS / Battery Datasheets [TBC-Placeholder]	53

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



Table of Figures

Figure 1: Site Analysis	16
Figure 2: Site Plan	17
Figure 3: Basement Floor Plan.....	18
Figure 4: Ground Floor Plan	19
Figure 5: Level 01 Floor Plan.....	20
Figure 6: Level 02 Floor Plan.....	21
Figure 7: Roof Floor Plan	22
Figure 8: Data Centre Sections.....	23
Figure 9: Receptor to the site.....	25
Figure 10: Hazard locations across the site	27

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



1 Introduction

1.1 Background

- 1.1.1 RED Fire Engineers Pty Ltd has been appointed by Legacy Project Management Pty Ltd to develop a preliminary Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for the proposed SM2 Data Centre located at 165 Williamsons Road South Morang VIC 3752.
- 1.1.2 This project involves the development of a new data centre facility. The site consists of 23 data halls. Twelve of these data halls have a floor area of 607.5 m² and IT capacity of 6.8 MW, whilst the remaining have a floor area of 800.75 m² and IT capacity of 9.1 MW

1.2 Purpose

- 1.2.1 This document is a preliminary Emergency Response Plan (ERP) for the proposed SM2 Data Centre. Its purpose is to set out, at a planning-stage level, how the credible emergency scenarios identified in the Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) would be responded to, so that the response framework can be reviewed by stakeholders and by Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV) as part of the town-planning process.
- 1.2.2 The ERP is intended to demonstrate that the emergency scenarios arising from the facility can be managed by a combination of on-site first response, engineered safety systems and the attendance of emergency services, and to establish the response structure that will later be formalised in the full site Emergency Plan

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act of 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

1.3 Scope, Objectives & Limitations

Scope

- 1.3.1 The scope of this preliminary ERP is deliberately narrow and reflects the planning stage of the project and the goals of an ERP:
- a) Response-only: This ERP addresses how to respond to an emergency once it has occurred. It does not set out day-to-day prevention, operational or work-health-and-safety controls.
 - b) PHA hazards only: Only the credible loss-of-control scenarios identified in the PHA are carried forward i.e. dangerous goods fire, deflagration / explosion / overpressure, battery thermal runaway and fire, and toxic / hazardous release.
 - c) Preliminary / planning-stage: Site details, layouts, muster points, contacts and consequence extents are indicative and subject to change as the design and the PHA are finalised.

Limitations

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



1.3.2 This ERP does not cover other facility emergencies that would be addressed by the full site Emergency Plan, including, but not limited to:

- a) flood and severe weather;
- b) medical emergencies & first-aid management as a whole-of-site program;
- c) bomb threat, security / civil disturbance and general workplace incidents;
- d) security, intrusion and cyber incidents;
- e) pandemic; and
- f) business continuity.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

1.3.3 The above and other emergencies may exist, and will need to be addressed in a broader project ERP at later stages of development.

Objectives of response

1.3.4 In any emergency at the site, response priorities are, in order of:

- a) Protection of human life (personnel, emergency responders and the public).
- b) Protection of the environment.
- c) Protection of property and assets.

1.3.5 Underlying these priorities, the objectives of a response are to prevent escalation, to support the control agency, and to achieve a safe return to normal conditions.

1.4 Status as an interim document

1.4.1 This preliminary ERP is an interim, non-planning-stage document. It is intended to be absorbed into, and superseded by, the full site Emergency Plan prepared to AS 3745-2010, developed in consultation with FRV before the facility becomes operational.

1.4.2 This document is not the full site Emergency Plan and does not attempt to be a complete emergency-management system. It is limited to the response to the PHA-derived hazards and is intended to inform planning approval, not to discharge the operator's operational duties.

1.5 Relationship to other documents

1.5.1 This ERP sits within a wider hierarchy of documents. The intended relationship is:

- a) PHA: parent document; identifies the credible hazards and control measures.
- b) This preliminary ERP: response framework for the PHA hazards at planning stage.
- c) Future full Emergency Plan / EMP (AS 3745-2010), ESIP / Emergency Information Book, Risk Management Plan (RMP), and the operator's SOPs, SWMS/JSAs and dangerous-goods manifest - to be developed as the project matures.



- 1.5.2 Operator responsibility: The operator is expected to develop and maintain its own prevention framework, standard operating procedures, safe work method statements, maintenance and inspection regimes, battery-management and dangerous-goods handling procedures, hot-work permits and day-to-day personal protective equipment. Those documents prevent emergencies and are not reproduced or replaced by this ERP, nor is that an exhaustive list of the operators responsibilities.

1.6 Applicable Legislation

- 1.6.1 The principal Victorian legislation associated with this Emergency Response Plan is:

- a) Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004, No. 107;
- b) Occupational Health and Safety Regulations 2017, No. 22;
- c) Dangerous Goods Act 1985, No. 10189, specifically section 28;
- d) Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022, No. 115, specifically Part 5 - Preparedness for incidents and emergencies, Division 3 - Equipment and planning;
- e) Environment Protection Act 2017;
- f) Environment Protection Regulations 2021; and
- g) Building Act 1993 and Building Regulations 2018 (Regulation 129 — consultation with Fire Rescue Victoria).

- 1.6.2 The Dangerous Goods (Storage and Handling) Regulations 2022, Part 5 Clause 53, are the operative instrument for emergency planning at this facility. Because the quantity of diesel stored exceeds the fire-protection quantity, the occupier must prepare an emergency plan for the premises and must obtain written advice from the emergency services authority (Fire Rescue Victoria) in relation to the fire-protection system.

- 1.6.3 These obligations sit alongside the general duties under the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 and Regulations 2017, the environmental duties under the Environment Protection Act 2017 (relevant to the containment of contaminated firewater run-off), and the fire-brigade consultation requirements of the Building Regulations 2018.

- 1.6.4 This ERP has been prepared having regard to the above legislation and to the emergency-planning framework of AS 3745-2010, Planning for emergencies in facilities. AS 3745-2010 is a referenced Australian Standard rather than legislation; the full site Emergency Plan into which this Preliminary ERP is to be developed is to be prepared in accordance with it.

- 1.6.5 The NSW Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No. 1 (Emergency Planning) has informed the structure of this document, but it is an NSW planning instrument and is not mandatory in Victoria. This ERP is framed to the Victorian legislative and emergency-services context.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



1.7 Stakeholders and Documentation

1.7.1 The stakeholders and referral authorities associated with this project are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Project stakeholders & Referral Authorities

Organisation	Role	Representative
Legacy Project Management (RED's Client)	Project Developer & Manager	Will Fuller Jack Spargo
Focus Environment	Environmental Engineering Consultant	Jon Lawson
FRV	Referral authority	Alam Hossain
Planning Property Partners	Planning Consultants	Paul Little Julain McCluskey
ADP Consulting	Multi-disciplinary Services Engineers	John Vollugi Rhys Bayhnam
RED Fire Engineers	Fire Engineering Consultant	Anya Chekulaeva
	Fire Safety Engineer	Ian Raymond
		Nate Lobel Abd Akbarzadeh

1.7.2 The relevant documents and drawings on which this report is based are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Relevant documentation

Organisation	Title	Project number/ ref	Date	Revision
Orbe	Fire Safety Study	-	Apr 26	1
Dover DC	South Morang Data Centres	-	Mar 26	-
Focus Environment	Dangerous Goods Storage and Planning	F0004061	02/07/25	-
Ewert Leaf	Site Analysis	M24062	11/08/26	B
	Site Plan			C
	Basement Floor Plan			B
	Ground Floor Plan			
	Level 01 Floor Plan			
	Level 02 Floor Plan			
	Roof Floor Plan			
	Sections			
	Program Areas			
Department of Transport and Planning	Development Facilitation Program PPA-1184, 165 Williamsons Road, South Morang	PPA-1184	17/07/26	-
RED Fire Engineers	Preliminary Hazard Assessment	JV26-00221	TBC	Draft



1.7.3 Citations and references used throughout this report are listed in Section 10.

1.8 Assumptions & Limitations

- 1.8.1 This Preliminary ERP is an interim deliverable. It is to be developed into, and absorbed by, a full site Emergency Plan prepared in accordance with AS 3745-2010, in consultation with FRV, prior to operation. Until then it does not constitute the operational emergency plan for the site and is not to be relied upon for construction or operation.
- 1.8.2 This Preliminary ERP sits within the following document hierarchy:
- a) PHA (parent) - identifies the credible hazards and control measures; this ERP responds to those hazards.
 - b) This Preliminary ERP - interim response framework.
 - c) Future full Emergency Plan / EMP (AS 3745), Emergency Services Information Package (ESIP) / Emergency Information Book, Dangerous Goods Manifest, and Risk Management Plan - to be developed as the design matures (PHA control measure CM23).
- 1.8.3 The operator remains responsible for developing and maintaining its own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Safe Work Method Statements (SWMS/JSAs) and day-to-day personal protective equipment (PPE) regimes to prevent emergencies from occurring. Those documents are not produced or reproduced here and this is not an exhaustive list of the operators responsibilities; this ERP neither duplicates nor discharges them.
- 1.8.4 In every scenario, response priorities are, in order: protect life; protect the environment; protect property; prevent escalation; and enable a safe return to normal.
- 1.8.5 Safety Data Sheets (SDS): none are available at this planning stage. SDS for all dangerous goods (including battery / electrolyte and diesel) are to be obtained and appended by the operator prior to operation.

1.9 Glossary and Abbreviations

1.9.1 Table 3 provides a glossary and list of abbreviations used in this document.

Table 3: Glossary and Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning	Definition
AEGL	Acute Exposure Guideline Level	Airborne exposure thresholds; AEGL-3 is the life-threatening / lethal level.
BESS	Battery Energy Storage Systems	Systems used to store energy in batteries for later use. For this project, it refers to battery rooms.
BMS	Battery Management System	A system that monitors and manages battery performance and safety.
BOWS	Building Occupant Warning System	Audible/visible system that warns occupants and gives instructions.



Abbreviation	Meaning	Definition
CAF	Compressed Air Foam	A foam firefighting medium.
CFA	Country Fire Authority	Victorian fire service supporting FRV where required.
CM	Control Measure	A control measure as numbered in the PHA.
DG	Dangerous Goods	Goods classified under the dangerous-goods regulations.
ECO	Emergency Control Organisation	Wardens and officers who direct emergency response (AS 3745-2010).
EMP	Environmental Management Plan	Site environmental management plan.
EP	Emergency Plan	The full site emergency plan (AS 3745-2010).
EPC	Emergency Planning Committee	Committee that develops and maintains the EP (AS 3745-2010).
EPA	Environment Protection Authority Victoria	Victorian environmental regulator.
ERP	Emergency Response Plan	This document.
ESIP	Emergency Services Information Package	Site information package for attending emergency services.
FIP	Fire Indicator Panel	Appliance displaying status of fire alarms and related systems.
FRV	Fire Rescue Victoria	Fire brigade in metropolitan Victoria
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials	Hazardous materials incident.
HF	Hydrogen Fluoride	Toxic gas that may be released from battery off-gassing.
HV	High Voltage	High-voltage electrical systems.
IC	Incident Controller	Senior site person controlling the initial response.
IR	Infra-red	Infra-red flame detection.
LFP	Lithium Iron Phosphate	A type of lithium-ion battery known for to be higher stable.
LIB	Lithium-Ion Battery	A rechargeable battery type based on lithium-ion chemistry typically with a hydrocarbon based electrolyte.
LoC	Loss of Control	Loss of control refers to situations where an individual or organization fails to maintain safe operations, leading to increased risk of accidents, injuries, or other adverse outcomes.
NCC / BCA	National Construction Code / Building Code of Australia	National building requirements.
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association	e.g. NFPA 69 (explosion prevention).
OHS	Occupational Health and Safety	OHS Act 2004 / Regulations 2017 (Vic).
O&M	Operation and Maintenance	Activities involved in operating and maintaining a system or facility.
PEEP	Personal Emergency Evacuation Plan	Individual evacuation plan for a person needing assistance.



Abbreviation	Meaning	Definition
PHA	Preliminary Hazard Assessment	is an exercise for the identification of hazards of a process facility and the qualitative or semi-quantitative assessment of the associated risk. A PHA provides information intended to assist managers and employees in making decisions for improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or unplanned releases of hazardous materials. A PHA is directed toward analysing potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and it focuses on equipment, instrumentation, utilities, human actions, and external factors that might impact the process.
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment	Protective equipment for personnel.
SFAIRP	So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable	SFAIRP asks what the available practicable precautions are and then tests which are reasonable based on the common law balance of the significance of the risk versus the effort and resources required to reduce it.
RCD	Residual Current Device	Electrical safety device.
RMP	Risk Management Plan	Site risk management plan.
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition	Site control / monitoring system.
SDS	Safety Data Sheet	Chemical / product safety data sheet.
SFIP	Site Fire Indicator Panel	Master fire indicator panel in the fire control room.
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure	Operator procedure.
SWMS / JSA	Safe Work Method Statement / Job Safety Analysis	Task-level risk assessments (operator-owned).
WorkSafe	WorkSafe Victoria	Victorian OHS and dangerous-goods regulator.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright



2 Description of Facility

ADVERTISED PLAN

2.1 Locational Context

General Site Information

- 2.1.1 Figure 1 presents the proposed site locations and its surrounding areas. As can be noted to the north is residential properties, whilst to the south, east, and west are commercial properties. The site itself has two electricity transmission easements and a single water supply easement. Next to the site is the South Morang Terminal Station.
- 2.1.2 Figure 2 presents the site arrangements. As can be seen, in the northern section is the data centre and associated fire water tanks and pumps. Whilst to the south is the substation. This, and the other drawings are still high level and will be refined as the project matures.
- 2.1.3 Figure 3 presents the basement arrangement for the data centre. Of note on this floor are the 16 diesel fuel tanks, each with a capacity of 110 kL and their associated pumps. Additionally, it is planned that other engineering plant systems will be located on this floor, including 18 industrial cooling water tanks, each with a capacity of 500 kL.
- 2.1.4 Figure 4 presents the Ground floor arrangement for the data centre. On this floor there is the office, which includes a loading bay and fire control room. There are seven data halls on this level. There are around 150 battery rooms on this level, in the mechanical service corridor. In the green area, generator set area (GenSet), there are 35 diesel generators. To the right side of the data centre is the potential fire tank and fire pump's structure.
- 2.1.5 Figure 5 presents the 01 floor arrangement, which consists of 8 data halls, plus battery rooms and diesel generators. Figure 6 presents the 02 floor arrangement, which consists of 8 data halls, plus battery rooms and diesel generators.
- 2.1.6 There are multiple generators and battery rooms for each data hall, with the exact configuration to be developed as the design progresses. Currently for redundancy purposes, it is understood that the batteries will be split across 154 separate dedicated battery rooms.
- 2.1.7 Figure 7 presents the roof floor arrangement, which consists of various plant spaces.
- 2.1.8 Figure 8 presents the section profile of the data centre, which shows that the basement has a height of 5.5 m, whilst the ground, 01, and 02 floors have a height of 7 m.
- 2.1.9 Across the 23 data halls there is expected to be around 5,000 server cabinets. With each cabinet energy density being 40 kW, then the total data hall energy load is 200 MW.





Figure 1: Site Analysis

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**


This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright



ADVERTISED
PLAN

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

Figure 2: Site Plan



This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

ADVERTISED PLAN

Figure 3: Basement Floor Plan




Figure 4: Ground Floor Plan

ADVERTISED PLAN

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**



**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**




Figure 6: Level 02 Floor Plan

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright




Figure 7: Roof Floor Plan

ADVERTISED
PLAN

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright




Figure 8: Data Centre Sections

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright



- 2.1.10 The mechanical service corridor on each level will house various service systems, including 154 battery rooms across the three floors. This area may not be completely air sealed to the outside area.
- 2.1.11 The GenSet area is opened on the external wall side of this area. Across the three floor there are 105 diesel generators.
- 2.1.12 The data centre has a surface area of 18,098 m² and a volume of 470,065 m³. Under the BCA, 2025, (ABCB, 2025), would categorise this building as a Class 8¹. The size of the data centre means it's a large isolate building, as defined in clause C3D4, i.e., it's larger than 18,000 m² or 108,000 m³. Therefore, this building needs to have the following fire safety measures:
- a) Entire building protected by sprinklers. Noting the function of the building, this capability likely to be achieved by other fitted fire suppression systems, and
 - b) Perimeter road access around the entire building. This is expected to be achieved via the ring road and using Williamsons Road (unmade and unused).
- 2.1.13 Each battery room will have dimensions of approximately 4 m x 4.5 m and 4 m in height. Each battery room will contain battery cabinets / units and associated power distribution system, referred to data centre power system.
- 2.1.14 Based on the information provided by ADP Consulting, it is understood that the power capacity of each battery room is required to be 250 kWh, however as that is end of life capacity, each room is assumed to be 300 kWh to allow for redundancy and reduced capacity over the lifespan of the batteries.
- 2.1.15 The closest off-site receptor and their distances are presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Off-site Receptor distances

Location Code	Emission Structures	Receptor	Distance (m)
A	Data centre	Residential property	70
B	Data centre	2-storey mixed use building	32.1
C	Power Transformer	Infinity Church	198

Site Processes

- 2.1.16 Unlike many other potentially hazardous industries, there is no manufacturing or material processing on site. The data centre provides data storage and analysis.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**


¹ Referenced to ORBE FSE Fire Safety Study



- 2.1.17 To support this process the site considers the provisions of substation, emergency diesel generators, and back up battery cabinets for emergency power.

Site activity and staffing

- 2.1.18 The site is expected to normally operate with limited staff. During the working hours there will be staff to conduct maintenance operations. After hours staff will be available to response to operational incidences.
- 2.1.19 Potentially, there could be around 200 occupants per level or a maximum occupancy of 600 across the building².



This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

ADVERTISED PLAN

Figure 9: Receptor to the site

Site Environment Inputs

- 2.1.20 The following provided information about the potential hazards associated with environmental events:
- a) Earthquake – (Burbidge, et al., 2012) presents updated earthquake hazard map for Australia. As this site is within Melbourne. This paper highlights that earthquake hazard in Melbourne is relatively low. Specifically, the hazard map shows a 0.08 AS 1170.4 Z-value and a 0.06 (G) 500 year Peak Ground Acceleration hazard value. The only viable control is to construct site buildings associated with site controls to meet AS 1170.4, with respect to

² Referenced to ORBE FSE Fire Safety Study



the forementioned values. Where this is not possible manufacturer's instructions for footing / foundations are to be at least followed.

- b) Wind speed – Maximum recorded wind speed for South Morang is 103.7 km/h and was recorded on 29 Oct 2021 ^[3]. This is a rare event as the average wind speed is 8.7 km/h (2.4 m/s) over the last 5 years.
- c) Flood – As noted at flood risk tracker ^[4] the flood risk for the site is low for river flood and low for storm surge.

2.1.21 Specialist advice is to be sought to confirm the above.

Hazard Locations

2.1.22 Figure 10 presents the hazards locations across the site as considered in the PHA and carried forward to this ERP.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

³ From <https://wind.willyweather.com.au/vic/melbourne/south-morang.html> accessed on 02 Sep 26.

⁴ From <https://floodrisktracker.steadfast.com.au/> accessed on 02 Sep. 26.




Figure 10: Hazard locations across the site

ADVERTISED PLAN

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**Hazard Sources Summary**

Ref	Hazard source	Key detail / quantity
L1	External factors	Trespass / vandalism; rail-line fire (eastern boundary); perimeter vehicle fire; cyber attack. Bushfire / grass fire are ruled out by location.
L2	Site operations	Operations and maintenance incidents, focused on the data halls.
L3	Battery rooms	154 battery rooms (nominal 300 kWh); source of thermal runaway, off-gas and HF.
L4	Power transformer	Two units, each ~45,000 kg oil, in a 25.7 x 17 m bund with a three-sided ~6 m fire and blast wall.
L5	Auxiliary transformer	At least two, within the substation.
L6	Neutral / earth transformer	At least two, within the substation.
L7	Diesel generator	105 units (35 per level), 3 MVA each; 1 kL day tank each.
L8	Diesel tank	16 basement tanks (110 kL each) plus refuelling zone, pumps and pipework.
L9	Data centre power system	Switchboards managing power from generators / battery rooms to the data halls; arc-flash source.
L10	Switchboard & control room	Substation switchboard and control room; arc-flash source.

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



3 Emergency Scenarios (Carried From the PHA)

3.1 Summary of credible scenarios from the PHA

- 3.1.1 The scenarios below are those carried forward from the PHA as credible loss-of-control events with the potential to require an emergency response. The PHA determined that the only scenario with a credible (and very low frequency) off-site consequence is a toxic release of hydrogen fluoride (HF) from battery thermal runaway; the remaining scenarios are principally on-site but are retained here because they require a first response and emergency-services attendance.

Dangerous goods fire

- 3.1.2 Fire involving combustible / flammable dangerous goods on site, principally:
- a) Diesel fire, day-tank, bulk-tank or refuelling-zone fire (pool fire within bunding), or a diesel-generator fire.
 - b) Transformer oil fire, pool fire within the transformer bund following loss of containment of combustible oil.

- 3.1.3 Diesel is stored at low level (basement) and within bunding, and the transformers are bundled and screened by a three-sided fire and blast wall, so containment of the burning liquid is the primary objective; extinguishment on any significant scale is impractical.

Deflagration / explosion / overpressure

- 3.1.4 A rapid pressure event, principally from ignition of accumulated flammable battery off-gas within a battery room / battery cabinet, or an electrical arc-flash event in a transformer, switchboard. Overpressure decays with distance; the credible effect is on-site, to adjacent equipment and to personnel in the immediate area.

Battery thermal runaway & fire

- 3.1.5 Failure of one or more battery cells leading to thermal runaway within a battery cabinet, with the following characteristic hazards:
- c) Off-gas: release of flammable and toxic gases (which may include HF) before and during runaway.
 - d) Fire and propagation: cabinet fire with potential propagation to adjacent cells or cabinets.
 - e) Re-ignition and stranded energy: residual energy in damaged cells can drive re-ignition hours or days after the initial event, so the incident is not considered over when visible flame is extinguished.

Toxic / hazardous release

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



- 3.1.6 Release of toxic gas: principally HF arising from battery thermal-runaway off-gassing. The PHA identified HF as the only scenario with a credible off-site consequence (an AEGL-3 contour), but at a very low estimated frequency and highly sensitive to wind: consequence analysis showed that with winds above ~1 m/s the off-site contour reduces significantly. Wind direction and speed are therefore central to the response (see Sections 5 and 6).
- 3.1.7 A transformer fire is also a potential source of hazardous combustion products; however, it is screened on three sides by a fire and blast wall and is not expected to produce a significant off-site toxic effect.

Escalation, domino & external interface events

- 3.1.8 Events that may escalate an incident or originate outside the site boundary, requiring hand-off to, or coordination with, the broader Emergency Plan and the control agency:
- a) Escalation / domino: fire or overpressure affecting adjacent equipment (for example a diesel or battery event affecting nearby electrical systems).
 - b) External initiating events: grassfire / bushfire encroachment from the wider bushland / grassland interface, a railway corridor fire on the eastern boundary, or a vehicle fire at the perimeter.
 - c) Firewater run-off: contaminated firewater from a battery, diesel or transformer fire, to be captured on site and prevented from reaching the stormwater system (see Sections 5.4 and 6).

Consequence extents

- 3.1.9 All consequence extents referenced in this ERP are indicative and remain subject to the final PHA and consequence modelling. On current analysis, the only expected off-site consequence - and a rare one - is an HF release under specific low-wind conditions.

3.2 Material Manifest

- 3.2.1 No complete site manifest exists at this stage of the site development. What is known at this stage of the site development:
- a) 154 battery rooms each with a capacity of 300 kWh, which are Class 9 PG II,
 - b) 1,760 kL of Diesel in basement tanks, Class 3 C1,
 - c) 105 kL of Diesel in days tanks for the diesel generators, Class 3 C1,
 - d) Approx. 120 kL transformer oil within the substation, Class 3 C2, and
 - e) Refrigerant gas of approx. 20 kL, Class 2.1.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



4 Emergency Response Organisation (preliminary)

4.1 Response structure & roles

4.1.1 At planning stage, the response structure follows the intent of AS 3745-2010, scaled to a facility that normally operates with limited staff. The full Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) - chief warden, deputy and area wardens, first-aid officers and communications - are to be appointed and formalised in the full Emergency Plan. Given low staffing, one person may hold more than one role. Indicatively:

- a) Incident Controller (site) - senior person on site; assesses the incident, directs first response, decides on evacuation and hands control to the FRV commander on arrival.
- b) Wardens / first responders - undertake first response (alarm, isolation if safe, evacuation and accounting) under the Incident Controller.
- c) First-aid officer(s) - render first aid within training limits until ambulance arrival.
- d) Communications - single point of contact for notification of emergency services and for liaison; media enquiries are not handled at site level.

4.2 Emergency Planning Committee & Emergency Control Organisation (to be established)

- This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Development Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright**
- 4.2.1 An Emergency Planning Committee (EPC) is to be established to develop, implement and maintain the full Emergency Plan in accordance with AS 3745-2010 (Section 2), including its membership, responsibilities and meeting cycle.
- 4.2.2 The Emergency Control Organisation (ECO) is to be formalised prior to operation. As a minimum it comprises a chief warden; a deputy chief warden, communications officer and floor/area wardens are to be appointed as determined by the EPC. ECO size is to be determined using the guidance in AS 3745-2010 Appendix F, having regard to the multi-storey layout and low normal staffing.
- 4.2.3 ECO members are to be identified (for example, coloured helmets or tabards per AS 3745-2010 Clause 5.8) and selected against the criteria in Clause 5.6.

4.3 After-hours response

- 4.3.1 The site normally operates with limited staff and may be unattended after hours. Detection and alarms are monitored and, for a battery room event, escalate automatically to FRV (CM34). An after-hours authorised representative is to attend to support FRV. After-hours arrangements are to be detailed in the full Emergency Plan (AS 3745-2010, Clause 4.2.2).

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



4.4 Media & public information

- 4.4.1 Media and public enquiries are not handled at site level. Statements are issued only through the operator / client; site personnel do not speak to the media during or after an incident.

4.5 Construction-phase vs operational-phase responsibilities (indicative)

- 4.5.1 Responsibilities differ between the construction and operational phases and are to be defined in the relevant phase plans. A key readiness requirement applies at the transition between phases:
- 4.5.2 Keynote - fire hydrant readiness. The site fire hydrant system is to be operational before the installation of batteries or the filling of the diesel tanks. No significant dangerous-goods energy is to be introduced to the site until firefighting water supply and hydrant coverage are available.

4.6 Interface with emergency services

- 4.6.1 FRV is the control (combat) agency for fire and HAZMAT at the site, supported by CFA where required, given proximity to the boundary between the two organisations' response areas. On arrival, the site Incident Controller hands control to the FRV commander, and thereafter, acts as technical adviser, providing site knowledge (isolation points, hazards, the HV easement, battery room status and system data) and remaining the single point of contact for responders. A clear command handover protocol is to be documented in the full Emergency Plan.

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document is to be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

4.7 Emergency contact directory (placeholder)

- 4.7.1 Each type of quantitative analysis carried out has a corresponding set of damages thresholds, related to life safety and the facility. This section sets out these values which are used across different assessments to determine the level

Table 5: Emergency Contact Directory (TBC)

Contact	Number	Notes
Emergency (Fire / Ambulance / Police)	000	FRV control agency
WorkSafe Victoria (incident notification)	13 23 60	24/7
EPA Victoria (pollution hotline)	1300 372 842	24/7
Poisons Information Centre	13 11 26	
Site Incident Controller / duty manager	[TBC]	
After-hours authorised representative	[TBC]	
Operator / O&M provider	[TBC]	
BESS supplier / battery specialist	[TBC]	

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



5 Emergency Response Procedures

5.1 Introduction

- 5.1.1 This section is the core of the ERP. It sets out the general response protocol and scenario-specific actions. Procedures are preliminary and will be finalised against the operator's SOPs and the site fire-system cause-and-effect matrix.

5.2 General response protocol

- 5.2.1 The general sequence for any emergency is:

- 1) Detect: identify the incident (person or automatic detection system).
- 2) Alarm: raise the alarm; activate site occupant warning (BOWS / external horns).
- 3) Assess: Incident Controller assesses type, scale and whether it is safe to intervene.
- 4) Notify: call 000 (FRV); notify communications / site management. For a battery room event, call the fire brigade without delay.
- 5) Isolate: isolate the affected system if, and only if, it is safe to do so (electrical, fuel, batteries).
- 6) Evacuate: evacuate to the appropriate (upwind) muster point on the Incident Controller's instruction.
- 7) Account: account for all personnel at the muster point.
- 8) Hand over: hand control to the FRV commander on arrival and support as technical adviser.

- 5.2.2 **If in doubt, raise the alarm and call 000 first:** doubt is clarified afterwards.

5.3 Notification, escalation & alarm tiers

- 5.3.1 A simple tiered model applies, consistent with the objective of early external notification for energy-storage events:
- a) **Tier 1 (local):** minor, controllable at the point of origin with on-site resources; notify the Incident Controller.
 - b) **Tier 2 (site):** may spread within the site; notify 000, activate warning systems and prepare to evacuate.
 - c) **Tier 3 (external):** potential off-site effect (for example an HF release under low-wind conditions); 000 is mandatory, evacuate, and support FRV in advising / protecting off-site receptors.

5.4 Emergency colour codes

- 5.4.1 Where colour codes are used, they are to align with AS 3745-2010 (Table 4.1). The following mapping applies to the SM2 scenarios and are to be confirmed in the full Emergency Plan.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



Table 6: Emergency colour codes (AS 3745-2010)

Colour	AS 3745 emergencies	SM2 application
Red	Fire and/or smoke	DG fire (diesel / transformer oil); battery room fire
Orange	Evacuation	Any evacuation to muster points
Yellow	Internally originating emergency	Toxic / HF release, spill, overpressure, infrastructure / utility failure
Brown	Externally originating emergency	Grass-fire encroachment; rail-corridor fire; vehicle to building impact*
Blue	Medical emergency	Casualty / first aid*
Purple / Black	Bomb threat / Personal threat	Out of scope of this ERP — addressed in the full Emergency Plan*

*Partly or fully out of scope of this ERP. For external emergencies for instance flood and earthquake are presumably out of scope.

5.5 Scenario response actions

5.5.1 Indicative first-response actions for each PHA scenario are set out in the action cards below.

5.5.2 Dangerous goods fire (diesel / transformer oil):

Table 7: Dangerous Goods (DG) Fire - First Response

Response Team	Response Description
All staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Warn others; raise the alarm and activate occupant warning. Do not fight a bund / pool fire beyond first-attack extinguisher use; withdraw if it cannot be safely controlled.
Incident Controller	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Call 000 (FRV). Confirm the fire is contained within bunding; keep ignition sources and personnel clear. Where safe and automated, confirm fuel isolation (generator fuel auto-shut-off via the SFIP; bulk-tank isolation). Confirm firewater run-off is being captured (drainage diversion — see 5.4). Evacuate to the upwind muster point; account for personnel; brief FRV on arrival.

5.5.3 Dangerous goods fire (diesel / transformer oil):

Table 8: Deflagration / Explosion / Overpressure - First Response

Response Team	Response Description
All staff	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Do not approach the affected area after an overpressure event until it has been assessed. Rescue casualties only where this can be done without undue risk.
Incident Controller	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Call 000 (FRV). Treat as a potential battery / electrical event; isolate power / battery room to the affected area if safe. Establish an exclusion zone around the affected room / cabinet.



Response Team	Response Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evacuate and account for personnel; brief FRV, including the possibility of further off-gas accumulation.

5.5.4 Battery thermal runaway & BESS fire

Battery room isolation procedures [TBC-placeholder]: Detailed battery room isolation and shut-down steps are to be developed with the battery supplier and integrated with the site fire cause-and-effect matrix (SFIP). The following reflects the intent of PHA control measure CM34 and is to be replaced by the operator's finalised procedure.

Table 9: Thermal Runaway / Fire — First Response (interim, per CM34)

Response Team	Response Description
On detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On battery room detection activation, call the fire brigade immediately (000). If not done within 300 seconds, automatic call-out is to occur. Activate the site notification system (BOWS / external horns).
Incident Controller	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Isolate the affected battery room and associated electrical systems, if safe to do so. Check wind direction and speed (windsocks / weather station); direct evacuation to an upwind muster point. Do not enter the battery room; treat off-gas as flammable and toxic. After hours, call out a site authorised representative to attend. Warn FRV of thermal runaway hazards: off-gas, deflagration risk, re-ignition and stranded energy - the event is not over when flame is extinguished.

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright.

5.5.5 Generator shutdown / isolation procedures

Generator shutdown / isolation procedures [TBC-placeholder]: Detailed diesel-generator shut-down and fuel-isolation steps are to be developed by the operator and integrated with the SFIP. The following reflects the intent of PHA control measure CM45 and is to be replaced by the operator's finalised procedure.

Table 10: Generator Shutdown / Isolation - First Response (interim, per CM45)

Response Team	Response Description
On detection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On detection of a fire within a diesel generator, the fuel supply is to be automatically shut off via the SFIP.
Incident Controller	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Confirm automatic fuel shut-off has operated; if not, isolate manually only where safe. Confirm generator electrical isolation. Confirm bund containment and firewater run-off capture. Call 000 if the fire is not immediately extinguished; evacuate and account for personnel.

5.5.6 Toxic / hazardous release (HF)

Table 11: Toxic / hazardous release (HF) - First Response (interim)

Response Team	Response Description
Incident Controller	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treat any battery off-gas / smoke plume as toxic (potential HF).



Response Team	Response Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Check wind direction and speed immediately (windsocks / weather station). Evacuate personnel crosswind / upwind; do not move personnel through or downwind of the plume. Call 000 (FRV) and state a possible toxic gas (HF) release from a battery event. If a credible off-site plume is possible under low-wind conditions, advise FRV so that off-site receptors can be warned / sheltered as FRV directs.

5.6 Firefighting & agent strategy incl. firewater containment

5.6.1 First-attack firefighting by site personnel is limited to portable extinguishers and, for diesel areas, foam hose reels - and only where it is safe and within training. Firefighting on any larger scale is an FRV function. Water is not to be used on electrical / battery fires by site personnel. A defensive / exclusion-zone approach is appropriate for a developed battery fire.

5.6.2 Firewater containment / environmental protection: In a battery, diesel or transformer fire, contaminated firewater run-off is to be captured and held in the site detention system, with the connection to the town stormwater drainage closed automatically (PHA control measure CM37). Because the battery room is indoor / above ground and the diesel is bunded at low level, containment is comparatively straightforward. Any suspected pollution incident is notifiable to EPA Victoria.

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The forward must suspected pollution purpose which may breach any copyright

5.7 Evacuation, muster & accounting

- 5.7.1 On the Incident Controller's instruction, all personnel and contractors evacuate to the nominated muster point - selecting the upwind / alternate point for any toxic-release or plume scenario. A roll / accounting of personnel and visitors is undertaken at the muster point, and any person unaccounted for is reported to the Incident Controller and then to FRV. Detailed evacuation arrangements, routes and muster points are to be finalised in the full Emergency Plan.
- 5.7.2 Evacuation priority. Those able to walk unaided evacuate first, then those needing assistance, then any who must be carried; persons who cannot be readily evacuated are moved to a safe holding area away from the hazard to await assisted evacuation.
- 5.7.3 PEEPs. Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans are to be prepared for occupants who may need assistance (AS 3745-2010, Appendix D).
- 5.7.4 Multi-storey considerations. On fire alarm, lifts are not to be used for evacuation and are to operate in their fire mode; occupants use the protected stairways. Refuge / holding arrangements and stair-discharge points are to be confirmed in the full Emergency Plan.



5.8 First aid / casualty management (preliminary)

- 5.8.1 First aid is provided only by trained first-aiders, within their limits, until ambulance arrival. First-aid provisions are to suit the site hazards — high-voltage and diesel injuries and chemical exposure - and are to include eye-wash. Given the HF hazard, first-aid guidance for hydrogen-fluoride exposure and appropriate provisioning are to be confirmed with the battery supplier and in the full Emergency Plan.

5.9 Fire-service access & on-arrival information

- 5.9.1 On arrival, responders may need to be met and directed to the incident. The Incident Controller (or a nominated person) meets FRV at the site entrance, provides access, and hands over key on-arrival information: incident location, hazards present, the HV easement, battery room / electrical status and any available system and wind data. This information feeds the future Emergency Services Information Package (ESIP) / Emergency Information Book, which is to be held at the site entrance emergency box and in the fire control room.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



6 Emergency Resources & Infrastructure (indicative)

- 6.1.1 The following resources and infrastructure are relevant to emergency response and are drawn from the PHA control measures. Their design and provision sit with the Fire Safety Study and the operator; they are listed here to show what the response relies upon.
- 6.1.2 Detection & alarm: site-wide fire detection and alarm to AS 1670.1:2018, such as triple-IR flame detection {TBC} and aspirating smoke detection {TBC}, connected to the site fire indicator panel (SFIP) in the fire control room (CM13, CM14).
- 6.1.3 Occupant warning: Building Occupant Warning System (BOWS) internally and external horns across the site (CM22).
- 6.1.4 Suppression: area-appropriate suppression, including high-pressure water mist / nitrogen systems and targeted CAF / foam monitor systems for the basement (TBC), GenSet and battery areas (CM8-CM12).
- 6.1.5 Battery room isolation / shutdown: battery room detection, isolation of cabinets and associated electrical systems, and battery-room explosion management / ventilation to NFPA 69 (CM34, CM50).
- 6.1.6 Firefighting water & hydrants: site hydrant system and water supply to AS 2419.1:2021, and foam hose reels for diesel areas (CM4, CM5); to be operational before batteries or fuel are introduced (see 4.2).
- 6.1.7 Bunding & containment: transformer bunds with de-watering, diesel-tank and refuelling-zone bunding, and firewater-run-off detention with automatic stormwater isolation (CM37, CM41, CM42, CM44, CM47, CM49).
- 6.1.8 Spill & PPE: spill kits near diesel sources, a first-aid kit suited to HV / diesel work with eye-wash, and approved PPE for HV, diesel and battery work (CM19, CM20, CM21).
- 6.1.9 Meteorological information: a site weather station and two windsocks (front and near the substation) to inform evacuation direction in a toxic-release scenario (CM24, CM33).
- 6.1.10 Signage, manifest / HAZMAT box (future) & communications: dangerous-goods manifest and emergency information, ESIP / emergency box at the site entrance, and two-way communication between staff and site management (CM2, CM23).
- 6.1.11 Routine service & testing: all fire-protection and life-safety systems (detection, suppression, hydrants and occupant warning) are to be maintained and tested to AS 1851, and occupant-warning / BOWS to AS 4428.4, with records kept — consistent with AS 3745-2010 Section 8.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



7 Termination, All-Clear & Recovery

7.1 Termination & all-clear

- 7.1.1 An emergency is terminated only when the control agency (FRV) confirms the hazard is resolved and returns control to the site. The Incident Controller then issues the all-clear to personnel. For a battery event, no all-clear is given until the risk of re-ignition from stranded energy has been assessed and cleared — a battery incident is not considered over when visible flame is extinguished.

7.2 Recovery & return to service

- 7.2.1 After stand-down, a recovery process is undertaken before normal operations resume: confirmation that affected systems are made safe and isolated; assessment and reinstatement of affected equipment and fire-safety systems; controlled re-energising only after inspection by a suitably qualified person; and disposal of damaged battery modules and contaminated firewater through licensed waste contractors, in coordination with EPA Victoria.

7.3 Post-incident notification, reporting & review

- d) Notifiable incidents are reported to WorkSafe Victoria immediately on 13 23 60 (OHS Act 2004), with written notice within 48 hours and the scene preserved so far as is safe.
- e) Pollution incidents (for example contaminated firewater escaping containment) are notifiable to EPA Victoria on 1300 372 842 (Environment Protection Act 2017, s.32).
- f) A written incident report is prepared and the ERP / Emergency Plan reviewed after the event; a fire or fatality may be subject to coronial and regulator investigation.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



8 Interfaces & Boundaries

8.1 Evacuation, muster & accounting

8.1.1 Explicit carve-out. This ERP is response-only. The operator is responsible for developing and maintaining the measures that prevent emergencies, including:

- a) standard operating procedures;
- b) safe work method statements / JSAs;
- c) maintenance and inspection regimes;
- d) battery-management-system (BMS) management;
- e) dangerous-goods storage-and-handling procedures;
- f) and hot-work permits.

8.1.2 Nothing in this ERP relieves the operator of those obligations.

8.2 Integration into the broader site Emergency Plan / EMP

8.2.1 This preliminary ERP is to be integrated into, and superseded by, the full site Emergency Plan prepared to AS 3745-2010 (with the associated Evacuation Plan, Emergency Information Book and dangerous-goods manifest), together with the site Environmental Management Plan.

8.3 Consultation

8.3.1 The full Emergency Plan is to be developed in consultation with FRV (as control agency and referral authority) and having regard to WorkSafe Victoria requirements, before the facility becomes operational.

8.4 Relationship to RMP / bushfire management

8.4.1 Where a site Risk Management Plan (RMP) is prepared, this ERP aligns with it. Bushfire / grass-fire is treated as an external initiating event handed off to the broader Emergency Plan; vegetation fuel-load management and non-combustible surfaces around electrical systems (PHA control measures CM35, CM36) sit within the operator's prevention framework rather than this response plan.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright



9 Training, Testing & Review (preliminary)

9.1.1 The following are preliminary commitments to be established in detail in the full Emergency Plan:

- g) Induction & awareness: all personnel and contractors to be inducted in the emergency arrangements relevant to their work, including the specific battery, HF and HV hazards.
- h) Drills & exercises: emergency drills and desk-top exercises covering the PHA scenarios, including a battery thermal-runaway / toxic-release scenario, on a defined cycle.
- i) Review & trigger events: the plan to be reviewed periodically and after any incident, drill, significant design change, or change in the PHA / control measures, and updated in consultation with FRV.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



10 References

- ABCB, 2025. *NCC 2025, Building Code of Australia: Volume One*. Canberra: The Australian Building Codes Board.
- Burbidge, D. et al., 2012. The 2012 National Earthquake Hazard Map of Australia. *Australian Earthquake Engineering Society 2012 Conference*, Dec.

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**



Appendix-A: Emergency Contact Directory [TBC-Placeholder]

Template to be completed and maintained current by the operator and held in the ESIP / emergency box and fire control room.

Role / contact	Name	Number
Emergency (Fire / Ambulance / Police)	—	000
WorkSafe Victoria (notification)	—	13 23 60
EPA Victoria (pollution hotline)	—	1300 372 842
Poisons Information Centre	—	13 11 26
Incident Controller	[TBC]	[TBC]
Deputy / after-hours representative	[TBC]	[TBC]
Communications officer	[TBC]	[TBC]
First-aid officer	[TBC]	[TBC]
Operator / O&M provider	[TBC]	[TBC]
BESS supplier / battery specialist	[TBC]	[TBC]
Electricity network / terminal station	[TBC]	[TBC]

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

ADVERTISED PLAN



Appendix-B: Indicative Site / Emergency Plan [TBC-Placeholder]

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**



Appendix-C: Scenario Response Action Cards [TBC- Placeholder if client develops]

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**



Appendix-D: PHA Scenario Cross-Reference

This appendix maps the ERP scenarios to the PHA and its control measures. Hazard-location and HAZID references are to be completed against the final PHA.

ERP scenario	PHA hazard source	Key control measures	HAZID ref.
DG fire — diesel	Diesel tanks (L8), generators (L7), refuelling zone	CM4, CM44–CM49, CM37	[TBC]
DG fire — transformer oil	Power transformer (L4); auxiliary / neutral (L5, L6)	CM40, CM41, CM42, CM43	[TBC]
Deflagration / explosion	Battery off-gas (L3); arc flash (L4, L9, L10)	CM50, CM15, CM38	[TBC]
Battery thermal runaway & fire	Battery cabinets / battery rooms (L3)	CM10, CM34, CM50	[TBC]
Toxic release (HF)	Battery thermal-runaway off-gas (L3)	CM24, CM33, CM34	[TBC]
Escalation / external / firewater	External factors (L1); firewater run-off	CM35, CM36, CM37	[TBC]

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**



Appendix E: Control Measures Register (from PHA)

The control measures (CMs) below are reproduced from the PHA (JV26-00221) and are the measures referenced throughout this ERP. They are provided here so that every CM cited in this document is defined in full. The CMs remain as defined and numbered in the PHA; where any wording differs, the PHA prevails.

Relevance column. The relevance flag is an indicative cross-reference only. "Response" marks measures this ERP relies on for detection, notification, isolation, containment, suppression support or evacuation. "Prevention" marks preventative / design measures that are the responsibility of the operator and the Fire Safety Study and are not actioned by this response plan. All CMs, regardless of flag, are to be delivered as set out in the PHA.

#	CM Title	CM Description
CM1	Safe Practices	An emergency response plan is to be developed for the site in addition to safe operational procedures and the like to instruct staff how to safely conduct business at the site.
CM2	Two-way communication	If/when operated unstaffed/from a remote station, two-way communication must be provided to site for responding staff/brigade. If the site is to operate unstaffed, the response time for a staff member in an emergency is to be considered in the emergency plan.
CM3	Portable Fire Extinguishers	PFF's to be provided as a minimum to NCC BCA and AS 2444, with additional fire extinguishers around small diesel storage (i.e. generator diesel tank) and outside of switchgear rooms with electrical hazards. Details/extent to be developed by the fire services engineer and in line with the fire safety engineer's requirements.
CM4	Fire hose reel	Fire hose reels are to be provided only for the diesel tanks and diesel generator areas. Whether fire hose reels in general are provided elsewhere is subject to the building fire engineering by Orbe.
CM5	Fire Brigade	A large fire is to be responded to by the fire brigade. Associated with this control measure is a fire hydrant system that provides coverage and water supply for the site as set out in AS 2419.1:2021 for the entire site, with potential modifications to be subject to R129 consent and approval as the design is developed.
CM6	Fire truck access	Around the data centre building and to the substation, there shall be appropriate fire truck access and mobility. This shall meet all the requirements from the Fire Rescue Victoria guideline and/or R129 approval, recognising that the data centre building is a large isolated building.
CM7	Switch Room Fire Protection	HV/MV switch rooms associated with the substation are likely to have fire suppression, subject to Ausnet final design, as Ausnet is the design authority for that area. AusNet design is to consider automatic power isolation if appropriate. Building LV switch rooms typically are proposed either as fire separated (no suppression) or may have a double knock sprinkler/mist system with location detection.
CM8	Basement level fire suppression system for diesel storage	A suitable fire suppression system is to be provided to the basement diesel storage area. This may for example be a mist system, or foam suppression system paired with detection, subject to further design development. All tanks are to be double skinned/self-bunded.
CM9	GenSet area fire suppression system	A suitable fire suppression system is to be provided to the GenSets. This may for example by a mist system or foam system, with details to be developed as the design



#	CM Title	CM Description
		progresses. The system must be approved/recommended for protection of generators. There is also to be fire separation around the generators, with the number of generators per fire compartmented area to be determined in detailed design.
CM10	Battery Room Fire Suppression System	A suitable fire suppression system is to be provided to battery rooms. This may for example be, a high-density sprinkler system, or mist system, paired with AS 1670.1 detection as well as specialist flammable gas detection such as Li-ion tamer or hydrogen gas detection.
CM11	Service and office area fire suppression system	A suitable fire suppression system is expected to be provided to the general areas such as office spaces and the like, other than specific areas with unique hazards. This may for example be standard sprinklers, in accordance with AS 2118.1: 2017. Removal of this system to general office areas however should not impact the findings of the PHA.
CM12	Data halls fire suppression system	A suitable fire suppression system is to be provided to the data halls. For example, a pre-action sprinkler system with aspirating detection throughout.
CM13	Fire Indicator Panel (FIP)	Fire detection and alarm systems, which meet AS 1670.1:2018, across the site, are to be connected to the main FIP (MFIP) via the FIP standard communication system. Any departures are to be agreed with the fire safety engineer, and some areas are expected to have enhanced detection. The fire safety study is to consider whether specific battery management system (BMS) alarms should be tied to the FIP, and if so can be done in accordance with AS 1670.1 or AS 4418.2 where SCADA is used. This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purposes which may breach any copyright.
CM14	Fire and smoke detection and alarm system	AS 1670.1 compliant, or as agreed with the Fire Safety Engineer and FRV. The technology utilised is to be suitable for the application.
CM15	Automatic power shut off	The BMS for each battery system is to be capable of automatically isolating batteries at module or rack level on identification of faults/unsafe to operate conditions. This must include abnormally high temperature.
CM16	Low voltage management system	Residual Current Device (RCD), to be provided in accordance with AS 3000. Additional isolation to protect fire brigade may need to be considered in future design stages.
CM17	Site security	There are two parts to this control measure: a. The entire site is enclosed by a security fence, b. The site access gates are to be covered by CCTV. CCTV will include motion sensing and an alarm system to notify staff of personnel moving around the site. Additionally, the doors of the data centre and the switchboard and control room are to be monitored. On unauthorised access and alarm is to notify the site operator.
CM18	Fire fighter access	The site operator and after hours site authorised representative are to be available to provide the fire brigade rapid access and support during an incident. This is to be further detailed in the FSS depending on whether the planned operation includes 24/7 on-site staffing or a mixture of on-site staffed hours and remote operation/management.
CM19	Spill kit arrangement	Appropriate spill kits are to be located near sources of dangerous goods, such as the diesel tanks and refuelling point.

ADVERTISED PLAN



Preliminary Emergency Response Plan

165 Williamsons Road, South Morang VIC 3752

#	CM Title	CM Description
CM20	First Aid kit	First Aid kits shall be provided on site, and located best to suit data centre operational and maintenance requirements. The operator is to review the requirements for first aid kits in line with their OHS responsibilities.
CM21	Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)	All PPE is to be fit for the task and potential exposure of staff. The operator is to define appropriate PPE for tasks and clearly describe them in involution processes, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and/or Safe Working Method Statements (SWMS), as appropriate.
CM22	Site wide incident notification	Within buildings, audio notification devices shall comply with AS 1670.1:2018, i.e., a Building Occupant Warning System (BOWS). Horn systems may be used outside the area of the site; this is to be connected to the BOWS.
CM23	Management Plans	Associated with a future Fire Safety Study, the following management plans are to be developed and issued: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Emergency Plan, b. Evacuation Plan, c. Emergency Information Book, and d. Dangerous Goods Manifest and Emergency Information
CM24	System monitoring	Site to have environmental sensors which can inform the site operator of at least temperature and wind (direction and speed), i.e., a weather station. All system sensor data to be shared with the site operator with notification related to potential / actual incidents. Details of notification to be developed as design progresses.
CM25	Site incident management	The site operator will need clear procedures for engaging and supporting emergency services during an incident. This would include when to call them, providing system status, and connecting them with the battery system operator/s/support.
CM26	Emergency Services	Access and procedures for when to call emergency services.
CM27	Site housekeeping	At least a monthly site inspection to remove unnecessary combustible material from the site.
CM28	Selection of Electrical Systems	Selection of all systems that are appropriate for the operations and the environment where they are to be located. This is to be shown by compliance with Standards. For example, where required rodent proof mesh or similar is to be provided to protect systems'.
CM29	Installation and maintenance of systems	Correctly qualified and experienced personnel are to be used to install and maintain the system.
CM30	Impact protection	Protection of external systems from vehicle damage is to be achieved by mechanical impact devices, such as bollards near the roads associated with the building and electrical system. These impact protection systems shall at least be located on the curves of the roads. An on-site speed limit is to be enforced to minimise risks of impact near equipment.
CM31	Lightning protection	Electrical systems and their associated cabling arrangements are to have lightning protection as required under AS 1768:2021.
CM32	Cyber attack protection	Cyber attacks could result in damage / fire to systems such as battery rooms and the diesel generators. Therefore, appropriate cyber protection measures are to be taken.
CM33	Access to meteorological data	The site operator is to have access to regional meteorological data.
CM34	Response to a battery room incident	Within the battery rooms, if the detection systems (lithium tamer or similar systems) activate then the site operator is to call the fire brigade (if not done within

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose other than the above.

ADVERTISED PLAN



Preliminary Emergency Response Plan

165 Williamsons Road, South Morang VIC 3752

#	CM Title	CM Description
		300 s, then automatic call out is to occur), activate the site notification system, and isolate the affected battery room. If after hours, call out a site authorised representative to the site. Details of this are to be developed in consultation with FRV as the design progresses.
CM35	Non-combustible surfaces	Site electrical systems (e.g. at the substation) are to be surrounded by crushed rock or non-combustible ground out to the clearance set out in AS 2067:2016. The use of fire rated structure can limit this distance. This surface may include access roads and paved ways. This applies primarily to the AusNet 220kV/33kV Substation; however AusNet will have ultimate design authority for the substation.
CM36	Vegetation fuel load	Proximity to substation vegetation shall be in line with Ausnet requirements.
CM37	Drainage and contamination system	In the event of a battery room or diesel generator / tank fire, the entire contaminated fire water run-off needs to be collected and held in the detention system. The alignment of the drainage system, including closing off the connection to the town stormwater drainage system, is to occur automatically.
CM38	Arc Flash assessment	Arc flash report in accordance with industry practices.
CM39	Fire rated data centre structures	Data halls, battery rooms, and the basement are to be fire rated structures.
CM40	Fire rated power transformer wall	The power transformer is to be encircled on three sides by fire and blast walls to protect the site and beyond. This applies to the AusNet substation, recognising that AusNet has ultimate design authority for the substation.
CM41	Bund transformer oil	Transformers are to be dry type so that any leak would be collected and held within the system, i.e., self-bunded or enclosure bund. Leak detection to be included; this may be a reduction in volume within the transformer. The bund and the structures to hold the transformer shall be able to withstand the pool fire event, in line with AS 1940: 2017. This applies to the AusNet substation, recognising that AusNet has ultimate design authority for the substation. Transformers in the actual building, i.e., data hall, are proposed to be dry-type.
CM42	Power transformer bund de-watering system	The power transformer bund size must comply with AS 2067 and AusNet requirements. This may include a requirement to consider rainfall simultaneous to a leak. This applies to the AusNet substation, recognising that AusNet has ultimate design authority for the substation.
CM43	Transformer Oil Selections	All High Voltage systems shall comply with AS 2067 or as agreed with Energy Safe Victoria and the relevant authority.
CM44	Diesel generators bunding	The diesel generators are to be contained within their own bunds. This bund shall be sufficient to contain the entire contents of the liquid in the system, as well as rain event, in the current design they are fully enclosed and therefore the volume is nil for rain.
CM45	Diesel generator fire isolation	On detection of a fire within a diesel generator, the fuel supply is to be automatically shut off, via the MFIP.
CM46	Diesel tank selections	The diesel tanks and their arrangement to meet AS 1940:2017, or as agreed with relevant authority. This may include additional measures over and above AS 1940 compliance.
CM47	Diesel tank zoning bunding	Groups of diesel tanks to be encircled by bunding. This is in addition to the integral bunding provided by double skinned tanks.

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning and enforcement Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright.

ADVERTISED PLAN



Preliminary Emergency Response Plan

165 Williamsons Road, South Morang VIC 3752

#	CM Title	CM Description
CM48	Diesel pipework and pump monitoring	Diesel flow rate / pressure within the pipework or pumps to be monitored to detect system leaks.
CM49	Refuelling zone bunding	Refuelling zone to be encircled by a roll over bund.
CM50	Battery room explosion management system	Within the battery room an approved / compliant combustible concentration reduction system which includes an air inlet and outlet for combustible gases. This system to meet NFPA 69 with deflagration calculations to NFPA 68. The battery room is to be fitted with an approved AS 1940:2017 ventilation system designed for lighter and heavier than air volatile gases.
CM51	Battery room door swing	The battery room door if swinging outwards must be designed to not turn into a projectile or fragment when the room is subject to a partial volume deflagration assessment. This may be considered as part of an NFPA 68 partial volume deflagration assessment.
CM52	Cable	Outdoor cables across the site shall not be treated with flame retardant but shall be self-extinguishing, i.e., pass IEC 60332-1, or equivalent. Other approaches may be applied by the electrical designer so long as they comply with appropriate regulations.
CM53	Battery room deflagration control	The FSS must include review of the potential for a deflagration inside a battery room. It is expected that the FSS will rely on a partial volume deflagration assessment by the battery OEM. This may require the installation of deflagration panels, or stronger enclosures to the room. The FSS is also expected to consider a more onerous deflagration scenario for potential emergency services planning. Determining this information requires analysis of the specific battery design and therefore is carried forward to the FSS.
CM54	Diesel fill point location	Diesel fill point shall be more than 50 m from the Ausnet HV powerlines.
CM55	Diesel Tank Rooms	Several additional requirements are proposed to be applied and/or investigated for the diesel tank room in the basement: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The tanks are to be positioned in groupings, it is expected that there may be 3-5 different groupings, Each tank is to be double skinned, with its own integral bund. Each grouping is to be provided with an additional bund, capable of holding not less than 110% the volume of the largest tank in the grouping, with additional allowance for the fire protection system to be determined. Each grouping is to be within a separate, dedicated, fire rated room, with an FRL of not less than (240)/240/240. Where possible, the fire rated enclosure to these rooms is to consist of non-structural walls (e.g. non-load bearing walls), to provide additional separation of structure from the tanks. The potential need to exceed the minimum concrete cover requirements of AS 3600 to achieve 240-minute FRLs is to be reviewed and may be implemented in design development. Whilst no formal FRL above 240 exists in AS 3600, this would be a way to effectively achieve an FRL greater than 240-minutes. Each diesel tank room is to be provided with an automatic fire suppression system, specifically

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright.



#	CM Title	CM Description
		<p>intended for use on pool fires. It is expected that this may be a mist system, foam system, or other suitable system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Fire hydrant locations relative to diesel storage are to be coordinated and agreed with FRV, with the potential need for additional hydrant locations to support tactical operations.

ADVERTISED PLAN

This copied document to be made available for the sole purpose of enabling its consideration and review as part of a planning process under the Planning and Environment Act 1987. The document must not be used for any purpose which may breach any copyright



Appendix G: SDS / Battery Datasheets [TBC-Placeholder]

Placeholder. No Safety Data Sheets are available at this planning stage. SDS for all dangerous goods on site - including battery / electrolyte, diesel and transformer oil - together with the BESS manufacturer's emergency-response datasheets, are to be obtained and appended here by the operator prior to operation.

ABCB, 2025. *NCC 2025, Building Code of Australia: Volume One*. Canberra: The Australian Building Codes Board.

Burbidge, D. et al., 2012. The 2012 National Earthquake Hazard Map of Australia. *Australian Earthquake Engineering Society 2012 Conference*, Dec.

**This copied document to be made available
for the sole purpose of enabling
its consideration and review as
part of a planning process under the
Planning and Environment Act 1987.
The document must not be used for any
purpose which may breach any
copyright**

**ADVERTISED
PLAN**