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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy

FINAL REPORT

in relation to the proposed

Mixed-Use Development at 79 – 81 Victoria Parade Collingwood Victoria 3066



for

Stockland

17th April 2026

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Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy
in relation to the proposed
Mixed-Use Development at 79-81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood Vic.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conclusions, Recommendations, Instrument Compliance and Overall CPTED Assessment

ES1 CPTED Conclusions and Recommendations: extracted from Section 12

In our professional opinion, the reviewed drawings and associated documentation supplied by Stockland and Wardle for the proposed mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood Vic. have incorporated affirmed and/or recommended CPTED elements into the design, or have the intention to incorporate, refine and improve the elements, during the design development-detail stages.

Incorporating affirmed and/or recommended CPTED elements will ensure 'welcoming-and-safe-place' objectives and outcomes for all stakeholders.

The following summary highlights key points from the report. The summary should be cross-referenced with our detailed assessments, conclusions and recommendations for each CPTED principle.

CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The reviewed drawings, renders and associated documentation incorporate Principle 1 elements into the design. There is territorial clarity in relation to all pedestrian circulation and activation. Spaces and zones reveal welcoming-and-safe-placemaking purpose. Vehicle wayfinding is equally clear.

Legible and permeable ground plane architecture designates public and private space, tenancies, amenities and garden gathering. There is basement destination certainty and there are separate, secure residential lobbies, all confirming safe circulation at the approaches to, site-wide and through-site wayfinding. Appropriate external lighting and signage will enhance safe day-night activation.

Drawings reveal no ambiguously allocated spaces or confusing spatial purposes. Intra-site spatial separation is readily identified across the ground plane, basement, and upper residential levels. Definitional clarity will enable and encourage safe and 'inviting' 24/7 informal foot traffic circulation and activation to, through and around all ground plane spaces.

This broad definitional clarity provides a foundation design statement, upon which to overlay Principles 2 to 5, as part of an integrated 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' whole.

The Basement 1 entry and Basement 2 transfer afford strong legibility and sightlines for parking plant and associated BOH functions, ensuring safe wayfinding to and from lift lobbies, stairwells, parking and storage spaces. The truck loading zone is equally clearly defined. We recommend that basement residential lift lobbies be secured.

Grasses, low shrubs and (low height) tree plantings, together with creative external lighting architecture will define the public and private garden gathering spaces as welcoming and safe.

The shared drop-off zone and seamless connection with café, retail and amenities is landscaped to minimise potential for concealment or entrapment, particularly in and around the basement, tenancy and residential entrances (Refer Principle 4).

In our view, there are no obvious CPTED-related definitional impediments evident in the architectural drawing set.

We conclude that the development's (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole', supporting the marketing and crime prevention (security) objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean an overall 'safe place' reputation – one which will be sustained, in part, by the commitment of stakeholder-operators to on-going crime prevention stewardship.

CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The development's appropriate separation of individual built form and public/private space elements (Principle 1) allows the promotion of multi-angle proximate and distant sightlines throughout the ground plane, residential levels and basement zones.

Natural surveillance opportunities along the Victoria Parade and Wellington Street perimeters, street facades, the colonnade and ground plane building footprints. Residential lobbies, retail entrances, associated tenancies and amenities, the connecting laneway, the basements, garden and social gathering public/private spaces share in the collective surveillance objective. Ground plane surveillance opportunities are the strongest.

Drawings facilitate natural (passive) observation and surveillance:

(i) throughout internal and external ground plane spaces and along contextual streetscapes
(ii) approaching, and at, pedestrian, vehicle off-street entries
(iii) within and approaches to, public/private garden and gathering spaces
(iv) within the basements
(v) on approaches to, at or around each of the retail, amenities, associated tenancies and residential lobbies
(vi) at and around the shared drop-off zone
(vii) where practical, within each ground plane building
(viii) where practical, from ground and upper-level residential apartments

Design development (DD) architecture should progress the above conclusions, detailing specific opportunities at, in and/or around all pedestrian and vehicle movement corridors, through-site street connectivity, retail entrances, amenities approaches and basement zones, thereby ensuring optimum day-night 'eyes and ears' awareness of usual and unusual internal and external activity.

As purposed, multi-angle, proximate-distant sightline opportunities, should significantly enhance risk mitigation, deterring potential anti-social or criminal intent and deterring unauthorised pedestrian or vehicle access within the footprint.

Loading, waste storage, collection and BOH plant will require surveillance augmentation from video camera installations.

We conclude that drawings maximise natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent damage to property and/or harm to user-stakeholders.

CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Our assessment concludes the need for a coordinated access control technology brief, standardising and/or integrating systems, including the technology admitting residents, guest-visitors, tenants, staff and contractors to their 'approved' areas.

Standardised and integrated technology is the key to ensuring the development's 'welcoming-and-safe' place reputation, deterring and/or preventing unauthorised access to critical plant or equipment. We recommend all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored, regularly capability-tested and maintained to ensure reliable performance.

It is also important that access restrictions be fully understood and complied with by residents, their guests, staff, tenants and contractors.

It is essential that access to plant and associated infrastructure, the loading area, waste storage, waste collection and general storage areas be strictly controlled.

We affirm and support the secure location of mailboxes and delivered parcels to prevent unlawful tampering or mail theft.

Maintenance and general contractors accessing sensitive and vulnerable zones should have to produce some form of validating identification prior to granting access to any secured space.

CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The three activity support areas are critical to safe site-wide night-time circulation and activation. Drawings facilitate design development opportunities for creative external lighting solutions, particularly throughout the site's ground plane to fulfill safe and inviting circulation and activation objectives.

Lighting elements and treatments should:

(i) illuminate the development site's footprint, perimeters and surrounds with (mostly) overhead luminaires to improve night-time wayfinding and surveillance
(ii) avoid colour inconsistencies (clashes)
(iii) maximise lux levels along wayfinding 'corridor' pathways, in the public/private garden gathering spaces, colonnade entry, shared drop-off zone, the basement entrances, within the basement itself and along the laneway.

External (and key internal entry) lighting treatment objectives should:

(i) support (night-time) surveillance at, and as 'spill' along, all points mentioned above in colour temperature 'step' to maximise natural and camera surveillance opportunities
(ii) be consistent with Council's roadway (street) lighting initiatives, proximate to the site
(iii) specify wayfinding lighting at the 4000 Kelvin temperature
(iv) provide 'no gap' wayfinding certainty throughout the basements
(v) continue sympathetic illumination, complementing spill lighting from retail and other ground plane tenancies and amenities.

We recommend LED luminaires (4000 Kelvin). Wayfinding luminaires should be sufficiently beam-angled to maximise throw, spill and (where appropriate) wash, eliminating shadowing and dark gaps while minimising glare. Movement-activated lighting is not recommended for basements as is it leaves most zones in darkness.

Bollards should not be considered for any external lighting within the development.

Landscaping solutions should:

(i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings
(ii) maximise sightline continuity
(iii) prevent the concealment of suspicious packages, and
(iv) deter potential accidental or 'hostile' vehicle access.

Signage should consider first-time resident-guests, visitor-shoppers, service and maintenance contractors to the site. All signs should be disability inclusive and where practical back-lit. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development. DD should detail inter-disciplinary solutions.

CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations

From the assessed drawings, we conclude:

We recommend targeted IP Network (CCTV) camera surveillance of the development footprint's vulnerable spaces, covering, as a minimum:

(i) residential entry lobbies
(ii) within the basement at all vulnerable points, including (secured) lift lobbies, disabled bays recommended help points, stairwells, plant doors and resident storage space
(iii) waste storage and collection points
(iv) entrance doorways to internal plant and external utilities infrastructure
(v) the approaches to retail and amenities spaces.

The determined location of cameras should assist in deterring opportunities for unauthorised access, for concealment or entrapment and with identification.

Help points should be considered for all vulnerable spaces including basement lift lobbies and disabled bays.

For all masonry finishes at ground plane interfaces, anti-graffiti coatings or alternate measures are recommended to minimise graffiti 'tagging'.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

ES2 Informing Instrument Compliance Conclusions: extracted from Section 13

Harris Crime Prevention Services' consultants conclude that the Stockland mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood, has intentionally applied, or will apply during design development, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, as required by the following State and Local Government instruments:

(i) The Victorian Department of Transport and Planning as the reporting authority of the Development Facilitation Program (DFP)
(ii) The Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning's Urban Design Guidelines for Victoria (2017)

(iii) The updated Yarra Planning Scheme (November 2025)
(iv) AS/ISO 31000:2018, Risk Management Guidelines
(v) ISO22341-2:2025 Security and resilience — Protective security — Part 2: Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design for residential facilities.

Our consultations with Stockland design teams reassure us that CPTED's welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' objectives will be met.

Harris is further assured that occupancy and operational protocols for the development will confirm compliance with the above instruments in furthering the safety (security) of all occupying and visiting stakeholders.

Subject to continued intentional inclusion of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, Harris supports development consent.

OVERALL CPTED ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Application of CPTED Principles and Informing Instrument Compliance

In our professional opinion, we conclude that the proposal by Stockland for a mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood Vic., has addressed the Harris-adapted CPTED principles as assessed, affirmed or recommended in this report.

Our conclusions specifically relate to the consultancy's focus on the entry points, ground plane circulation-activation, public/private areas, residential, retail, amenities, the drop-off zone and basement vehicle access and parking, landscaping, lighting, signage, and site-wide 'target hardening' measures to enhance the coordinated CPTED strategy.

We are confident that designing-out-crime measures for residents should ensure their safety and security in relation to ground plane and basement access-egress.

We reaffirm that the development's incorporation of CPTED principles is guided by, or complies with, the Victorian and Local Government urban design and planning requirements.

Harris Crime Prevention Services consultants' are of the view that the development should make a positive crime prevention contribution to the City of Yarra's broader 'community safety' (crime prevention) objectives, in line with Stockland's objectives to deliver a landmark seamless urban living destination and experience that offers flexibility, luxury and security while contributing to the surrounding community character.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Consultancy in relation to the proposed Mixed-Use Development at 79 – 81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood Vic.

THE REPORT

1 Report Structure

Executive Summary: Key Conclusions, Recommendations, Compliance and Overall Assessment

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Section 2	development details
Section 3	report aim: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)
Section 4	project description
Section 5	site and context
Section 6	CPTED consultancy engagement
Section 7	CPTED platform, principles and the Harris approach
Section 8	CPTED scope, outcomes and key stakeholders
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Section 13	informing instrument guidelines and compliance
Section 14	overall CPTED assessment summary
Section 15	references
Section 16	supporting appendices 1 and 2.

2 Development Details

Site address:	79-81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood, VIC 3066
Site area:	5,272 sqm
Title details:	Lot 1 TP8388438 (City of Yarra)

3 Report Aim: Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

This report has been prepared for Stockland to support their project vision by incorporating CPTED principles into relevant architectural elements to promote 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking'.

Harris defines 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' as: '*built form and public space environments where crime prevention has been a consideration of concept, master-planning, design development and construction processes and where safe place outcomes enhance a project's overall reputation'.*

The report addresses (a) CPTED's placemaking role and (b) the project's compliance with statutory and/or informing guidelines.

4 Development Project Vision - Description

Stockland's development project vision - description is: "*to create a staged build-to-sell scheme incorporating a high-quality, connected ground plane, including the appropriate amount of well-located retail and recreational spaces. This scheme aims to demonstrate connections through to both existing and future surrounding open space, streets and lanes.*

Connectivity with surrounding future development opportunities is encouraged. Massing and staging should consider how to break down the overall scale of this project to present a contextually appropriate outcome."

Stockland notes: "*Collingwood is busy during day-time hours with around 15,000 people coming to the suburb to work each day. Visitors are attracted to the area on both weekdays and on weekends, though primarily during the day. The night-time economy is driven by both residents and day-time workers staying on after work*." (Development Summary Pack, April 2025)

Wardle's Presentation (September 2025) describes the development as being 'stitched' into the environment; seeing how it both contributes to, and is an integral part of, its built form neighbours.

There is a commendable open invitation to seek public participation as part of a vibrant community. This foreshadows (a) an overall design which needs to be crime and security risk aware and (b) creative architectural solutions to deter and prevent potential risks from becoming threats and incidents. The CPTED input has addressed, affirmed and/or recommended adaptive design for this (crime) risk mitigation objective.

5 Site and Context

The subject site is in an area of Collingwood that continues to see significant urban renewal. The site is located on the prominent corner of Wellington Street and Victoria Parade, with the latter being one of Melbourne's key boulevards.

The site is also adjacent to a Major Activity Centre, the Central City and is located on the Principal Public Transport Network along Victoria Parade. The site is within close walking distance to Smith, Gertrude and Brunswick Streets. The Melbourne CBD is a 5-minute tram ride or 1.5 km away. (Stockland April 2025).

Much of Wellington Streetscape lacks wayfinding permeability and purpose, other than to allow pedestrians to proceed to other streets, transport, nearby built form and/or minor retail destinations. The development's ground plane profile thankfully disrupts that mundaneness.

6 CPTED Consultancy Engagement

Harris Crime Prevention Services (Harris) has provided a crime risk and Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) consultancy in relation to Stockland's Collingwood mixed-use development proposal (the development or project) at 79 – 81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood Vic.

Our engagement aimed to assist the project's design team to 'design out crime' by mitigating known or potential antisocial and criminal behaviours, applying CPTED principles to place-making architecture, in accordance with Stockland's vision.

(i) There is an overarching marketing placemaking objective: to deliver a landmark seamless urban living destination and experience that offers flexibility, luxury and security that contributes to the surrounding community character.

(ii) There is an overarching crime prevention placemaking objective: to affirm, support and/or recommend architectural elements that will facilitate 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' outcomes.

The Development Facilitation Program (DFP) requires a CPTED report under Section 17… *"to demonstrate how Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles will be integrated into the development.*" (**refer Section 13**)

7 CPTED – Platform, Principles and the Harris Approach

7.1 CPTED Platform

Designing-out crime through the application of CPTED principles is an acknowledged crime prevention platform. Harris defines **CPTED** as '*applying aspects of architecture, engineering and technology to all urban development proposals (projects) as an intentional environmental crime prevention strategy'.*

7.2 CPTED Principles

Our report's assessment, conclusions and recommendations are based on five acknowledged CPTED principles, adapted by Harris from the Moffatt (1983) CPTED framework as:

Principle 1 Territorial definition – spatial identify, separation, boundaries and purposes
Principle 2 Natural surveillance – architecture facilitating strong sightlines for surveillance
Principle 3 Access control – access-egress definitions - who goes where, when and why
Principle 4 Activity support – the influences of (external) lighting, landscaping and signage
Principle 5 Target hardening – adding specific and robust architecture and technology.

CPTED-applied architecture aims to 'block' opportunistic and/or pre-meditated anti-social or criminal behaviour within the development footprint and its approaches. The ultimate crime prevention objective is to ensure 'welcoming-and-safe-place' reputational outcomes for all stakeholders.

7.3 The Harris Approach

The Harris approach to crime prevention design and management incorporates aspects of architecture, engineering and technology which underpins the 'welcoming-and-safe-place' objective. This approach seamlessly welcomes, defines, guides, directs, encourages, regulates activity, appropriate functional objectives. Safe place design outcomes seek to override opportunistic and deliberate anti-social and criminal behaviour.

Note 1 Harris' consultancy services are provided independently, i.e. we are *not* affiliated with, nor receive benefits from, any organisation that supplies security hardware, installs security systems, monitors alarm systems or provides guarding/patrol services. This independence is critical to the way we approach security solution options and recommendations.

Note 2 The scope excluded the development/provision of a technical security brief, security systems design and specifications or lighting brief and specifications.

Note 3 The commentary, assessment, conclusions and recommendations outlined in the report are based on information provided to Harris Crime Prevention Services at the time of this assignment.

Disclaimer While our research and experience suggest CPTED can be adopted to reduce opportunities for crime, it is not possible to guarantee that actual crime will be reduced or eliminated if these suggestions and/or recommendations are implemented.

8 CPTED Scope, Outcomes and Key Stakeholders

8.1 CPTED Scope and Outcomes

The scope addresses crime risk and crime prevention (CPTED) solutions, underpinning this preliminary (and subsequent) final report. Our consultants have:

(i) clarified with the architect/client regarding the development's crime risk parameters
(ii) undertaken a physical inspection of the site and neighbourhood to better understand the development's placemaking relationship with its surroundings

(iii) assessed potential day-evening crime risk 'disruption' to site -wide safe activation, circulation and interconnectivity between each tower's architectural elements
(iv) reviewed drawings with specific CPTED focus on public and restricted areas, lift foyers, building entrances, reception location, the retail footprint, open space objectives, through-site links, vehicle access and parking
(v) ensured the security of utilities and communications infrastructure, waste and storage areas
(vi) affirmed and/or recommend CPTED solutions based on acknowledged principles - territorial definition, natural surveillance, access control, activity support (lighting, landscaping, signage) and target hardening
(vii) completed a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design report.

Harris believes that incorporating CPTED principles should provide a welcoming-and-safe-place reputation by:

(i) enhancing the architectural integrity and objectives of the development
(ii) holistically protecting all assets – people, property, systems and infrastructure
(iii) meeting the expectations of secondary stakeholders, e.g. insurers, auditors.

8.2 Key Stakeholders

Key stakeholder groups are:

(i) Stockland
(ii) Development Facilitation Program, Department of Transport and Planning
(iii) Yarra City Council
(iv) stakeholder-residents and retail-commercial tenants
(v) Victoria Police
(vi) adjacent neighbours and broader Yarra City communities.

While each stakeholder will have different community safety expectations, their broad expectations are similar in that personal and property safety is a 'given' of the designing-out-crime objectives.

9 Statutory and Supporting Instruments

Our assessment, conclusions and recommendations are informed, required and/or supported by:

(i) Victorian Government, Department of Transport and Planning, Development Facilitation Program
(ii) Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, *Urban Design Guidelines for Victoria*
(iii) Yarra Planning Scheme
(iv) data from the Victorian Government's Criminal Incidents for Yarra LGA
(v) AS/ISO 31000:2018, *Risk Management Guidelines*, which provides a helpful framework to identify and manage any organisational risks, include crime risks
(vi) ISO22341-2:2025 Security and resilience — Protective security — Part 2: Guidelines for crime prevention through environmental design for residential facilities.

Relevant instrument compliance is addressed in **Section 13**.

10 Crime Risk Assessment

10.1 Melbourne CBD and Urban (Local Government) Contexts

There are acknowledged and frequently reported anti-social and crime risks common to most city and suburban contexts throughout Australia. Anti-social behaviours are usually seen as 'nuisance', disturbing or disruptive, designed to attention-seek and/or intimidate people. Criminal offences may or may not escalate from anti-social behaviours, but all too often, the two behaviours are linked.

Often serious offences will result from 'unchecked' anti-social behaviour and progress to individual or group (gang) criminality which can be linked to territorial 'ownership' disputes. In our view, this development should assume the possibility of both.

Local Government cities and towns also experience the same behaviours. Offenders in rural communities and usually known to police and the community, although lately, in our experience, offenders may seek anonymity by either taking anti-social and criminal behaviours either to nearby rural contexts or, to Melbourne CBD, for example, to further increase anonymity.

10.2 Yarra Local Government Area - Reported Crime Data

Our information is that the Victorian Government's criminal incidents per 100,000 population does not single out Collingwood as a separate suburb. **Appendix 1** provides the data, helpfully over a 10-year period, 2016 – 2025.

There are five listed broad categories – A: crimes against the person, B: property and deception offences, C: drug offences, D: public order and security offences and E: justice procedures offences.

Of note, in relation to potential criminal activity targeting the development, are the following trends:
Category A: 60% average increase over 10 years
Category B: 26% average increase over 10 years
Category C: 10% average decrease over 10 years
Category D: 10% average decrease over 10 years
Category E: 05% average increase over 10 years

Categories A and B are the most concerning. However, it must be noted that the data is ONLY for reported crimes. Nonetheless, both categories are those likely to 'target' the development. Our crime risk assessment is based on this assumption and provides the focus for CPTED mitigation solutions – **Section 11**.

10.3 Crime Risks to the Development Site

The development is 'crime risk vulnerable' because its raison d'etre is: "*to create a staged build-to-sell scheme incorporating a high-quality, connected ground plane, including the appropriate amount of well-located retail space*". The connected ground plane is a key 'invitational' element, including potential public and communal space disruptive elements, who will seek to take (anti-social or criminal) 'advantage' of residents, shoppers and casual site visitors enjoying the through-site links and social gathering opportunities. The built form could also be targeted for 'tagging' or other damage.

Anecdotal understanding, site knowledge, local police intelligence and contextual Victoria reported crime data are likely to confirm common (and mostly predictable) crime categories.

Assessment is based on four risk levels: 'low' (**L**), 'moderate' (**M**), 'high' (**H**) and 'extreme' (**E**), adapted from the ISO Risk Management Standard – refer Appendix 2.

Categories (i) to (vii) are the most likely to negatively impact the development. They are:

(i) intimidating anti-social behaviour targeting all pedestrian categories - residents, guests, shoppers, retail tenants, staff, casual site visitors and contractors (**M - H**)
(ii) physical and/or sexual assaults against the (i) above categories, especially at night (**L - M**)
(iii) unauthorised access to retail, residential, recreational, basement and BOH spaces (**M**)
(iv) theft of individual, retail or corporate property (**M**)
(v) damage to buildings, facades, plant, vehicles, infrastructure, landscaping, signs, furniture, fixtures and fittings (**M**)
(vi) theft from, or of, motor vehicles (**L - M**)
(vii) contextual or site-based drug possession, and drug dealing. (**M**)

There are three other potential crime risks and levels. The likely-to-occur levels are:

(viii) arson or explosion(s) (**L**)
(ix) injury or death to persons, damage to, or destruction of, property, from targeted and potentially, gang or terror-style attacks (**L**)
(x) 'hostile' vehicle site penetration. (**L**)

While assessed as (**L**), these three categories are increasing and have significant consequences if they are 'successful'.

Assessing *potential* risks, levels and categories must always be balanced against the '*consequences*' of breaches and *actual* criminal threats or incidents. Even the most minor offences can have major consequences.

The potential for the above crime risks 'targeting' this development also relates to the 'newness' factor. In our experience, would-be offenders will always 'test' new developments to look for weaknesses in security design and operations.

11 CPTED Applications to Achieve 'Welcoming and Safe Place' Outcomes

The crime risk and mitigation solutions are assessed against each CPTED principle. They 'flag' elements to inform the interdisciplinary design team, as development documentation and drawings progress. Applications address:

(i) CPTED elements already 'present' in current design drawings
(ii) CPTED elements to be considered as drawings are finalised.

11.1 CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definition: clarity about spatial identity, separation, boundaries and purposes

Principle 1 General Explanation

Defining territorial boundaries, spatial separation and purposes are the elements of this first CPTED principle. The aim is to maximise built form and public domain 'knowledge certainty' for all who have day-night access to a site.

Stakeholder, occupant, visitor, emergency response or contractor knowledge (identification) of territorial sub-spaces increases destination and circulation confidence; (for example, design of mixed-use spaces including, building entrances, public, communal, sporting, retail, commercial, residential, industrial, social gathering, wayfinding and vehicle access spaces).

When spaces become clearly defined collective 'places', form and function are easily identified. This removes confusion of purpose, enhances safe circulation and maximises alertness to any surrounding risks or threats.

11.1.1 Application – Overall Footprint Definitions

The mixed-use footprint presents definitional element clarity (knowledge certainty) across basement, ground and upper levels.

The immediate interface with Victoria Parade and Wellington Street underscores the intended public contribution to the development's vision. From a CPTED perspective, the 'porous' nature of the pedestrian interface is both a welcome exploratory drawcard and a design-operational challenge to manage and minimise potential crime risks.



Image 1 indicative and welcoming 'porous' ground plane pedestrian circulation – Wardle

The architecture unpacks the public, private, retail and other tenancies, residential and basement zones (sub precincts), all of which define an intentionally 'busy' mix of pedestrian and vehicle circulation and activation. The aim is to also attract pedestrians from nearby interfacing laneways, as through-site exploratory experiences.

Design development (DD) will continue to ensure 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' (**Section 3**).

The many entry and access points are clearly indicated on drawing sets, leading to definitive wayfinding to each destination, that is, off street site access, retail and residential entry, public and private open spaces, the basement entry, truck entry and porte cochere.

These definitions reduce and/or eliminate location confusion, providing instead, destination certainty. Ground plane walkability 24/7 will be 'safe-place'-enhanced by legible and permeable openness of public and private (communal) ground plane spaces, to be supported by appropriate landscaping, lighting and signage.

Retail and other tenancies will encourage resident and community shopping, café, dining and well-being experiences. The outdoor public/private garden and allied social gathering spaces in today's (crime risk) environments will benefit from natural and video surveillance.

All to-site and through-site vehicle and pedestrian circulation will provide definitional confidence for regular and 'first time' users/occupiers of the sub-precinct spaces. CPTED 'looks for' this definitional confidence.

11.1.2 Application – Boundary Definitions

The street and property boundaries are clearly identified – indicating each vehicle and pedestrian access point.

While there are no obvious entrapment or concealment points along each boundary axis. DD hard and soft landscaping is mindful that plantings and furniture does not cause entrapment-concealment 'fear'.

Both streetscapes 'invite' public participation through architectural 'openness'.

Image 2 from the public plaza looking east, inviting open pedestrian participation - Wardle

11.1.3 Application – Separation and Purpose of Spaces

As mentioned, (**11.1.1**), there is no spatial confusion throughout the footprint. Public and resident access, basement access and wayfinding to the site's various front-of-house (FOH) and BOH locations, ie: retail tenancies, amenities, social gathering/garden, café, restaurant spaces, lift lobbies, drop-off and basement zones, are all legibly drawn. All are appropriately 'separated' as to purpose, providing inviting and safe circulation to each location.

11.1.4 Application – Public, Private and Communal Spaces

Defining the openness or otherwise of these specific ground plane and upper-level spaces is a key feature of maintaining the safety (security) of each. The architecture and operational management of public through-site access and participation has addressed, the 'safe place' objectives of both spaces, which will be separated by a gate. DD will continue to refine the spatial separation architecture.



Image 3 public (yellow 24 hours) and public/private (green and blue restricted) footprints – Wardle

Image 4 indicative sketch of the open, inviting public plaza showing spatial 'identity' – Wardle

Image 5 indicative sketch of the spatially inviting neighbourhood garden – Wardle

11.1.5 Application – High Volume and 'Pinch Point' Pedestrian Circulation and Activation

The invitational circulation 'mix' of through-site and 'stay-and-play' public participants, residents and their guests, tenancy staff, shopper-clients and contractors, present an additional design and management challenge. The defining form-and-function architecture will require tight and constant security 'layers', in maintaining safe circulation and activation.

Safe design (and management) considerations to cope with 'pinch points' relate to expected high-volume pedestrian traffic, especially in favourable seasonal conditions. The ground plane will 'draw' people come from neighbouring mixed-use properties, seeking a more inviting public space environment.

Again, lighting and landscaping design will play an important part in 'demonstrating' the 'welcoming-and-safe-place' day-night activation objectives. (**Refer 11.4**)

11.1.6 Application – Residential and Tenancy Entry Definitions

Residential tower entrances and lobby drawings maximise multi angle definitional (approach) clarity. Secured basement and ground level lifts will 'guide' (admit) residents and guests to secure upper-level lobbies and lifts. Access to these levels will be controlled via the appropriate authentication-validation technology.

11.1.7 Application – Residential Apartments

We have reviewed available apartment designs and outlooks to public, communal and streetscape spaces. There are no CPTED-relevant design issues.

11.1.8 Application – Vehicle Drop-Off Interface

The definitional 'openness' of the drop-off zone assists in the 'distribution' of residents, guests and visitor-clients to the many ground plane 'attractions', adding a layer of security legibility to the overall garden and built form wayfinding to desired destinations.

Image 6 under-croft circular drop-off, seamlessly connected to the garden precinct – Wardle

11.1.9 Basement Entry and Parking Layout

Drawings appropriately define and 'direct' vehicles, including BOH traffic, to and through Basements 1 and 2, entering and exiting Basement 1 from Wellington Street and initially sharing the drop-off zone. We recommend a 'split' access-egress design to deter 'tailgating'.
Internal basement ramping and vehicle parking bays follows typical and coded definitions. Both basements allow for strong sightlines along each walled axis, along and around the parking bays, approaching plant and storage rooms, at the lift lobbies and stairwells.

For added security, the residential lift lobbies should have secure access, enabling observation while waiting for a lift to arrive. The separate retail lift lobby and retail goods lifts should also be secured to reduce potential entrapment.

Level Basement 1 provides retail staff parking, single and tandem resident parking, EV bays, limited bicycle stands, a resident loading turntable and disability bays, which should be located close to each lift lobby. We note the location of secured storage and plant rooms. Stairwell locations and doorways are also clearly visible.

Level Basement 2 is for residential vehicle, motorcycle and bicycle parking, clearly identified with a continuation of a secure residential lift lobby, secure general and residential storage.

Basement entry, ramping and layout designs allow for strong sightlines along each walled axes, along and around the parking bays, approaching plant rooms and the lift lobbies.

Current drawings appropriately indicate stairwells adjacent to lift cores. Locating disabled parking bays proximate to lift lobbies should also be a priority.

It is essential that proposed landscaping in and around the vehicle access ramp don't create (at maturity) concealment or entrapment possibilities.

11.1.10 Application – General Storage, Waste Storage and Collection

All waste storage and collection points are clearly identified and secured in Basement 1.

Design should easily facilitate procedures for waste storage and collection, to be strictly followed by residents, tenancy and contractors to ensure there is no unauthorised access to these zones. Fire detection and suppression systems should be installed.

11.1.11 Application – Utilities Infrastructure and Other Plant

Protecting all utilities infrastructure is critical. Defining and securing each element forms the basis for a collective approach as to who has access to what and why.

All plant rooms must be clearly defined and secured. All external meters, booster and hydrant systems should be enclosed (caged or preferably in recessed cabinets) to deter unauthorised access, tampering with, or damage to, valves and pipes.

Image 7 example of secure external booster and adjacent plant – SOM Architecture

Locating (exposed) kiosks should also deter graffiti or other cabinet damage and should be under video surveillance. Consideration should be given to 'wrapping' cabinets with Palisade-style fencing and gates, to deter concealment, graffiti and other potential damage.

11.1.12 Application – Mail and Building Document Management

It is reassuring to note the secure location of combined residential mailbox, document delivery and parcel rooms. The locations, part of the secure residential lobbies add a preventative measure to reduce mailbox 'break-ins'. This an important DD element as mail theft is increasingly occurring from external and exposed cluster boxes. Thieves are stealing mail mainly for identity theft.

Tenant mailboxes should also be located and secured to avoid criminal outcomes.

11.2 CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance: architecture facilitating informal observation

Principle 2 General Explanation

The principle of natural (aka informal or casual) surveillance encourages (i) the observation of built form and public domain spaces and purposes by user/stakeholders and (ii) the observation and notation within or around spaces of usual or unusual activity and behaviour, potentially (or actually) leading to anti-social or criminal threats and incidents.

Natural surveillance is purposeful observation. Maximum surveillance impact requires sightline certainty, facilitated by clear proximate-distant and longitudinal-latitudinal fields. The aim is to know who or what is within a surveillance field and to observe specific unlawful action or intent.

Legible and permeable architecture should ordinarily promote natural surveillance in and around clear reference fields. CPTED surveillance-focused architecture adds a crime prevention 'layer' to legible and permeable circulation and activation creativity.

11.2.1 Application – On-site and On-Street (Ground Plane) Surveillance

While on-site ground plane (natural) surveillance is critical, on-street surveillance from the site is a desirable extension. The idea is to 'advise' passers-by that they can be observed, lest they have any anti-social or criminal 'thoughts' of targeting the site. Consideration might be given to designing seating furniture able to encourage two-way surveillance.

Within the site, sketches (see images above) indicate legible, multi-axes and interconnected ground plane sightlines. Ample space between the structural and landscaped elements should combine to significantly boost proximate and distant visual certainty. Night-time surveillance will be supported by appropriate lighting – **Section 4**.

Given the definitional certainly of the site, observation (surveillance) along, and at, multiple intersecting circulation-activation axes, will be maximised.

Proximate sightlines are strong, enhancing opportunities to note, record and/or report suspicious anti-social or crime-related behaviour.

Distant sightlines to the site will come from the contextual (on-street) and boundary foot and vehicle traffic. Definition + strong sightlines facilitate the day-night 'eyes and ears' observation of the usual and unusual.)

(Context, purpose and definitional clarity are critical elements in maximising the development's natural surveillance benefits.)

11.2.2 Application – Residential Buildings Surveillance

Surveillance from upper residential levels might be effective as they are closest to the ground level sights and sounds, whether on the perimeter streets (roads) or within the footprint, if the windows and/or balconies face either.

While sound 'rises' it needs to be sufficiently 'concerning' to alert occupants to visually check unusual or alarming noise disturbance. The higher the residential levels, the less likely occupants will be 'drawn' to surveillance (observation) interest.

[**Notes in relation to design considerations**: In our experience, and from scholarly research, legible and permeable ground plane surveillance has advantages.

(i) Sightlines are at eye level facilitating proximate and distant surveillance.

(ii) The hearing range is closer meaning incidents are more likely to be sight-sound identified, even when there are contextual distractions.
(iii) There is a sense of context – the observer and/or hearer is usually within or near the same space and is 'drawn' to any unusual or disturbing behaviour.
(iv) Contextual eyes-and-ears surveillance may cause a 'no response' and/or withdrawal from involvement, while still retaining memory of what was seen or heard.
(v) There are many examples of individuals or groups physically responding to, and/or reporting on-street or in premises threats or incidents.
(vi) Night-time on-street person and property surveillance is still effective due to retaining same-plane visual and aural (audible) cues.

11.2.3 Application – Basement (Including Back-of-House - BOH) Surveillance

There are five natural surveillance zones for Basement Levels 1 and 2, the approach and entry, the ramping and bays, the lift lobbies, stairwells and plant/storage rooms.

(i) Approach and entry

The approach offers clear sightlines leading to the vehicle roller door(s). This includes the truck entry.
The aim is to reduce and/or eliminate sightline impediments, especially in relation to potential vehicle or pedestrian 'tailgating'. External lighting should ensure effective night-time surveillance continuity.

(ii) Ramping and Parking Bays

Ramping and bay layouts follow standard carpark designs. The ramps are sufficiently wide to permit longitudinal sightlines to the various parking bay options.

(iii) Lift Lobbies

Lift lobbies should be separately secured spaces, well-lit and (yellow painted) ground-marked for wayfinding ease.

(iv) Stairwells

Stairwell doors should be easily observable with high lux level lighting and ground-marked for easy wayfinding.

(v) Loading, Storage and Plant Rooms

The movement of vehicles at and around basements should not block or restrict observability of these zones, where they are planned for basement location.

11.2.4 Application – Waste Storage and Collection Surveillance

Wherever located, it is imperative that all waste – bulk, residential and retail – have natural surveillance opportunities on approach to doorways.

11.2.5 Application – Utilities Infrastructure Surveillance

Externally located cabinet-recessed utilities infrastructure, including the kiosk and any booster pumps or hydrants on Victoria Parade, should be proximately observable and should be free from adjacent objects and landscaping – **the Image 7 example**.

11.3 CPTED Principle 3 Access Control: who goes where, when and why

Principle 3 General Explanation

Access control is a consequential extension of defining territory (Principle 1) and natural surveillance (Principle 2). Open and/or restricted access must be: (a) readily identified through the appropriate built

form (approach) architecture, (b) supported by electronic access control systems (eacs) and (c) able to prevent and/or identify unauthorised access.

11.3.1 Application – Access to Site Precincts (Zones)

The architecture should both welcome and where necessary, restrict legitimate access to all ground plane design elements. The through-site experiences are part of the day-night exploratory (ground plane) invitation. The only barriers to 'self-guided' exploration should be clearly defined and signed as 'no-go' general access, especially residential entry lobbies.

Management (access control) is required for the residential, retail, recreational (wellbeing), amenities and some communal spaces. Contractors, staff and tenants must comply with access control procedures, for example, accessing ground plane, upper levels and basements for plant and infrastructure maintenance.

11.3.2 Application – Access Control from Commercial and Medical Carpark

The design will maintain the level above existing medical and commercial laneway parking to deter unauthorised 'climbing' access to apartments.

11.3.3 Application – Access To, and Within, The Basements

Basement Level 1 is the 'busiest' both in terms of vehicle and pedestrian access and in terms of BOH plant storage, waste collection and utilities infrastructure. It is critical therefore to ensure access-limiting technology and access procedures are deployed. Lift lobbies should be 'secure-designed' – **refer 11.1.9**.

Resident, retail staff, contractor and emergency vehicle access to this basement especially will require coordinated control measures, designing and applying at DD access technology which, incidentally, should be standardised and/or integrated throughout the residential site.

A second boom gate, or other measure where practical, is desirable to deter unauthorised inter-ramp and basement access. Basement 2 is free from plant etc., confining its purpose to parking, including bicycles and residential storage. However, we reiterate designing secure lift lobbies.

Unauthorised access basement off-street entry is likely, given the necessary opening and closing 'slowness' of standard access roller shutters. Vehicle and pedestrian tailgating is *more* likely where there is a single (combined) entry and exit ramp. Ideally, we would recommend two-way access shutters and camera surveillance.

11.3.4 Application – Residential Buildings and Communal (Garden) Spaces Access

In one sense, unauthorised access to residential apartments is potentially the most vulnerable. As mentioned above, access control systems must ensure that admission is monitored and/or recorded. Residents, tenants and contractors will become aware of the consequences of violating access control protocols and procedures, requiring site-wide management-stakeholder compliance.

11.3.5 Application – Storage, Plant, Waste and Utilities Infrastructure Access

All exposed (and even internally recessed) infrastructure is 'vulnerable' to potential targeting (tampering). We support the recessed cabinet (security) benefits of enclosing hydrants and boosters, thereby removing the potential (unlikely as it may seem) for tampering with equipment, 'planting' explosive devices and hostile vehicle targeting. Enclosed ground plane cabinet or caging must be free from obscuring landscaping. (**Refer Image 8**)

11.3.6 Application – Access to Tenant and/or Resident Mailboxes

Design elements (Principle 1) indicate minimal likelihood of unauthorised access to mailboxes and parcel delivery points.

11.4 CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support: influences of (mainly external) lighting, landscaping and signage

Principle 4 General Explanation

Activity support applies (external) lighting, landscaping and signage architecture to a footprint's form and function design, 'supporting' definitional clarity, passive and technical surveillance and access control (Principles 1 to 3).

***External (and where appropriate Internal) lighting** should reflect 'purpose' consistency: wayfinding, destination, social gathering and decorative-aesthetic. Each requires differing luminaire styles, lighting types, spread, throw, spill, wash and lux levels, to accord with lighting Standards and architectural briefs.*

CPTED lighting applications can (should) often exceed those Standards and briefs so as to highlight spaces and circulation - activation 'corridors'. Differential lighting should avoid cross-over colour (temperature) clashes to enhance surveillance identification of property and people.
All external lighting should optimise sightline legibility, to facilitate proximate-distant wayfinding and destination confidence.

***Landscaping** should combine aesthetics and purpose with an intent to prevent concealment or entrapment.*

***Signage** supports wayfinding and destination certainty, access limiting (controlling), warning and emergency awareness. It should have day-night visual impact.*

11.4.1 Application – Lighting Consistency and Ground Plane Wayfinding 'Corridors'

External lighting will play an important security, including surveillance role at key ground plane zones. Under croft, basement approach, 24-hour public and private-communal spaces, the laneway, wayfinding to tenancies, amenities and residential lobbies require consistent footprint lighting.

External and complementary internal ground plane (spill) lighting should accentuate safe night-time circulation-activation. It is a critical 'support' for the 'welcoming-and-safe-place' vision; an integral part of the mixed-use brief for residents, tenancies and site 'explorers'.

From a CPTED perspective, it is essential to present consistent ground plane lighting characteristics at site approaches, entrances, the above-mentioned inviting communal/public spaces and retail destinations. The consistency should eliminate shadows or gaps, ensuring strong beam angles, throw spill and wash. The building facades could be 'washed' to highlight approaches.

A lighting 'masterplan' must therefore maximise wayfinding certainty and safety by specifying and overhead and/or recessed roof luminaires (e.g. at off-street points and under the porte cochere).
The multi-purpose night-time ground plane pedestrian flow is a surveillance support goal. Decorative concept lighting for garden and social gathering areas should play a complementary lighting role, without causing unnecessary colour clashes.

LED lighting is assumed and we recommend 4000 Kelvin, as the most appropriate colour temperature to maximise proximate and distant wayfinding, surveillance and, where necessary, identification.

(**Note**: The white-natural light spectrum at 4000 Kelvin has advantages over blue, orange or yellow colour output. Yellow, orange and blue renditions distort natural colour profiles and features. White light installations strengthen contrasting colours and identify individual (personal) features more distinctly. Complementary street lighting should match this temperature.)

We do not recommend any bollard lighting installations. Bollards create glare and tend to interrupt sightline or way-finding certainty. Bollards are also prone to damage, can become hazards and can

often be 'buried' by mid height public/private space landscaping. Also, in our experience, wall-mounted lights for wayfinding and 'gathering' purposes can create spatial glare and should be specified sparingly.

11.4.2 Application – Laneway Lighting and Ground Plane Interface

Images 8 and 9 render and sketch indicating potential for overhead lighting from street-to-site and in public activation zones to ensure safe 'no gaps' wayfinding. – Wardle

While the Victoria Parade laneway will be locked at night, it is still important that the laneway itself and either end access-egress points remain well-lit (and video camera supported) to indicate attempted unauthorised access will be observed.

11.4.3 Application – Basement Lighting

The basements should be illuminated with overhead lighting that covers, the roller shutter (door) entry, wall areas, parking bays, internal ramping and the doorways to lift lobbies, storage zones, stairwells, plant and/or infrastructure. It is imperative that no part of either basement be 'shaded' or in darkness. Movement-activated lighting is not recommended as it leaves much of the basements in darkness.

Where appropriate in the basement, lux levels should exceed the Standard to enhance a sense of safety.

Image 10 indicative example of internal basement lighting wall and ceiling 'saturation' - Harris

11.4.4 Application – Landscaping – General Observations

Landscaping (and lighting above) will define the attractiveness and safety of the entire footprint's ground plane exploratory circulation and activation.
Drawings indicate landscaping concepts covering all ground plane public and private spaces, approaches to the site, setbacks, garden gathering and the laneway. The hard, soft, garden and dense planting proposals should offer broad and safe options for residents, shoppers and casual site visitors.

In CPTED terms, we recommend:

(i) no mature trees or shrubs obstruct, or be located at, the building facades, entrances and lower-level balconies. Mature plantings around these spaces can conceal or entrap
(ii) plantings not obscure multi-axes observation
(iii) any above-ground boxed or 'contained' plantings have wire mesh or choir matting placed at minimal depths below mulch, to avoid secreting drugs, other suspicious packages or potentially explosive devices. This recommendation may seem extreme, however, given the 'high consequences' of these behaviours, the solution is a simple, smart and cost-effective risk mitigation practice to consider.

11.4.5 Application – Landscaping to Deter/Prevent Accidental or 'Hostile' Vehicle Access

There are increasing risks relating to the accidental or deliberate (hostile) vehicle penetration of vulnerable pedestrian-only or shared spaces. To mitigate such risks from Wellington Street especially, 'hard' landscaping should be considered for:

(i) off-street pedestrian and vehicle entrances, along the street-facing colonnades, around social gathering and retail spaces. They would include aesthetically appealing barriers, for example sculptured sandstone, robust anchored planter boxes, log barriers, or some combination
(ii) the porte cochere which arguably is especially vulnerable. Decorative sandstone barriers could also be installed as (landscaped) chicanes, thereby preventing vehicles from high speed 'straight targeting' of this zone.

These architectural options should provide sufficient deterrent and boost safety.

11.4.6 Application – Signage

Signage always adds to safe wayfinding**.** DD will consider safety and security value throughout the site. Ground plane directional signage is the key to wayfinding and access controlling knowledge.

Signs should reflect a consistency of style aimed at providing wayfinding confidence, destination (arrival) certainty and access-limiting advice.

Throughout and around the site, where practical, signs should be colour coordinated, legible and visually 'readable' to cater for human height differences and should be disability inclusive. International pictorial signage is a preferred option.

Regular users of ground plane destinations will soon become familiar with signs and their purposes. However, new day or night-time shoppers and communal visitors will find visually attractive directional (wayfinding) and destination signage helpful and less confusing.

Emergency (including fire and exit) signage is subject to codified compliance. If emergency or 'help' points are to be considered (**Refer 11.5.2**), these measures should incorporate appropriate contact and response capability.

11.5 CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening: adding specific and robust architecture and technology

The Harris (generic) explanation and advisory

Target hardening is often called 'situational' crime prevention. It aims to reinforce other CPTED principles and to proactively 'strengthen' form, infrastructure, structures, fixtures, fittings and furniture in and around identified vulnerable spaces. Target hardening design is an added crime risk defence layer.
Design measures aim to increase the efforts intending offenders must expend attempting to damage property and/or harm or injure people.

Target hardening can apply additional physical, mechanical, structural and electronic treatments to deny or limit access. Electronic alarms or surveillance cameras are the more common target hardening measures. However, the Principle's design goal is to avoid place 'fortressing'.

11.5.1 Application – Video Surveillance Installations

This target hardening measure complements natural surveillance. Technical 'eyes' are becoming the norm to identify offenders and offences but should be applied sparingly, targeting the more vulnerable spaces. There are two project options (i) direct image feeds to security or other nominated security contractors, able to respond from mobile or proximate devices, and/or (ii) stored image feeds for later review.

Creating and sustaining the development's 'welcoming-and-safe-place' reputation requires video surveillance in the following locations as a minimum:

(i) within both basements including the B1 entrance, all internal ramping, car parking spaces, lift lobbies, stairwells, at the service vehicle (truck entry) zone focusing on unloading, delivery and on waste transfer operations
(ii) approaches to ground plane retail, amenities, other tenancies, public-private/communal gardens and gathering spaces and residential entrances
(iii) at and around cabinet-enclosed utilities infrastructure, including electrical kiosk(s)
(iv) along each street-fronting (perimeter) pathway, in conjunction (partnership) with Yarra City Council's broader policy.

11.5.2 Application – Help Points

Although it may seem an extreme measure, consideration should be given to installing *monitored* help points at key locations within both basements, e.g. at basement lift lobbies and at disabled parking bays. Help points should be within view of surveillance cameras. Help point technology can be integrated with advanced IP video surveillance systems, avoiding the need for additional infrastructure in the basements.

The condition of installing help point technology is that the 'feed' would need to go to a personally carried device, for example a smart phone or tablet for a prompt threat or incident response.

Help points must be boldly and clearly marked for easy identification. Illuminated 'help point' signage (under camera surveillance) provides a level of reassurance where people feel, or are, vulnerable.

Help points may also be considered for other ground place zones, especially given the high pedestrian through-site and in-site traffic. Help points may also act as a deterrent against anti-social or criminal behaviour in vulnerable spaces and at vulnerable times.

11.5.3 Application – Building Facades

The building facades are prime targets for 'tagging'. While no masonry coatings can guarantee protection from graffiti damage, we recommend investigating and applying the latest protective material, and/or coatings to minimise likely defacing of the masonry areas at ground level. The coatings should also facilitate ease of graffiti removal.

The 'it-is-there-and-it-is-new' challenge may tempt offenders and 'test' security measures. Causing wall or building damage is a relatively easy 'test' option for potential offenders wanting to 'test-escalate' their intentions.

11.5.4 Application – Public and Private/Communal Social Gathering Furniture

Specifying robust seating and associated furniture-fittings in open spaces deters and/or prevents 'crazed' opportunists weaponizing those objects.

11.5.5 Application – Accidental or 'Hostile' Vehicles

Prevention of accidental or 'hostile' penetration of ground plane sub-precincts requires target-hardening measures, preferably as part of the landscape brief (**Refer 11.4.5**).

11.5.6 Emergency Assembly Areas

These will be code-defined. It is essential that they be 'clutter' free, that is zones where robust or 'loose' gathering furniture, drinking fountains or waste bins etc. are not located near the areas. The areas should be appropriately high lux-level illuminated.

12 Summary: CPTED Conclusions and Recommendations

In our professional opinion, the reviewed drawings and associated documentation supplied by Stockland and Wardle for the proposed mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood Vic. have incorporated affirmed and/or recommended CPTED elements into the design, or have the intention to incorporate, refine and improve the elements, during the design development-detail stages.

Incorporating affirmed and/or recommended CPTED elements will ensure 'welcoming-and-safe-place' objectives and outcomes for all stakeholders.

The following summary highlights key points from the report. The summary should be cross-referenced with our detailed assessments, conclusions and recommendations for each CPTED principle.

CPTED Principle 1 Territorial Definitions Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The reviewed drawings, renders and associated documentation incorporate Principle 1 elements into the design. There is territorial clarity in relation to all pedestrian circulation and activation. Spaces and zones reveal welcoming-and-safe-placemaking purpose. Vehicle wayfinding is equally clear.

Legible and permeable ground plane architecture designates public and private space, tenancies, amenities and garden gathering. There is basement destination certainty and there are separate, secure residential lobbies, all confirming safe circulation at the approaches to, site-wide and through-site wayfinding. Appropriate external lighting and signage will enhance safe day-night activation.

Drawings reveal no ambiguously allocated spaces or confusing spatial purposes. Intra-site spatial separation is readily identified across the ground plane, basement, and upper residential levels. Definitional clarity will enable and encourage safe and 'inviting' 24/7 informal foot traffic circulation and activation to, through and around all ground plane spaces.

This broad definitional clarity provides a foundation design statement, upon which to overlay Principles 2 to 5, as part of an integrated 'welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' whole.

The Basement 1 entry and Basement 2 transfer afford strong legibility and sightlines for parking plant and associated BOH functions, ensuring safe wayfinding to and from lift lobbies, stairwells, parking and storage spaces. The truck loading zone is equally clearly defined. We recommend that basement residential lift lobbies be secured.

Grasses, low shrubs and (low height) tree plantings, together with creative external lighting architecture will define the public and private garden gathering spaces as welcoming and safe.

The shared drop-off zone and seamless connection with café, retail and amenities is landscaped to minimise potential for concealment or entrapment, particularly in and around the basement, tenancy and residential entrances (Refer Principle 4).

In our view, there are no CPTED-related definitional impediments evident in the architectural drawing set.

We conclude that the development's (combined) definitional elements present a coordinated and integrated 'whole', supporting the marketing and crime prevention (security) objectives. In turn, these objectives should mean an overall 'safe place' reputation – one which will be sustained, in part, by the commitment of stakeholder-operators to on-going crime prevention stewardship.

CPTED Principle 2 Natural Surveillance Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The development's appropriate separation of individual built form and public/private space elements (Principle 1) allows the promotion of multi-angle proximate and distant sightlines throughout the ground plane, residential levels and basement zones.

Natural surveillance opportunities along the Victoria Parade and Wellington Street perimeters, street facades, the colonnade and ground plane building footprints. Residential lobbies, retail entrances, associated tenancies and amenities, the connecting laneway, the basements, garden and social gathering public/private spaces share in the collective surveillance objective. Ground plane surveillance opportunities are the strongest.

Drawings facilitate natural (passive) observation and surveillance:

(i) throughout internal and external ground plane spaces and along contextual streetscapes
(ii) approaching, and at, pedestrian, vehicle off-street entries
(iii) within and approaches to, public/private garden and gathering spaces
(iv) within the basements
(v) on approaches to, at or around each of the retail, amenities, associated tenancies and residential lobbies
(vi) at and around the shared drop-off zone
(vii) where practical, within each ground plane building
(viii) where practical, from ground and upper-level residential apartments

Design development (DD) architecture should progress the above conclusions, detailing specific opportunities at, in and/or around all pedestrian and vehicle movement corridors, through-site street connectivity, retail entrances, amenities approaches and basement zones, thereby ensuring optimum day-night 'eyes and ears' awareness of usual and unusual internal and external activity.

As purposed, multi-angle, proximate-distant sightline opportunities, should significantly enhance risk mitigation, deterring potential anti-social or criminal intent and deterring unauthorised pedestrian or vehicle access within the footprint.

Loading, waste storage, collection and BOH plant will require surveillance augmentation from video camera installations.

We conclude that drawings maximise natural surveillance objectives; that is, to generate whole-of-site surveillance opportunities to deter and/or prevent damage to property and/or harm to user-stakeholders.

CPTED Principle 3 Access Control Conclusions and/or Recommendations

Our assessment concludes the need for a coordinated access control technology brief, standardising and/or integrating systems, including the technology admitting residents, guest-visitors, tenants, staff and contractors to their 'approved' areas.

Standardised and integrated technology is the key to ensuring the development's 'welcoming-and-safe' place reputation, deterring and/or preventing unauthorised access to critical plant or equipment. We recommend all physical and electronic access control systems be monitored, regularly capability-tested and maintained to ensure reliable performance.

It is also important that access restrictions be fully understood and complied with by residents, their guests, staff, tenants and contractors.

It is essential that access to plant and associated infrastructure, the loading area, waste storage, waste collection and general storage areas be strictly controlled.

We affirm and support the secure location of mailboxes and delivered parcels to prevent unlawful tampering or mail theft.

Maintenance and general contractors accessing sensitive and vulnerable zones should have to produce some form of validating identification prior to granting access to any secured space.

CPTED Principle 4 Activity Support Conclusions and/or Recommendations

The three activity support areas are critical to safe site-wide night-time circulation and activation. Drawings facilitate design development opportunities for creative external lighting solutions, particularly throughout the site's ground plane to fulfill safe and inviting circulation and activation objectives.

Lighting elements and treatments should:

(i) illuminate the development site's footprint, perimeters and surrounds with (mostly) overhead luminaires to improve night-time wayfinding and surveillance
(ii) avoid colour inconsistencies (clashes)
(iii) maximise lux levels along wayfinding 'corridor' pathways, in the public/private garden gathering spaces, colonnade entry, shared drop-off zone, the basement entrances, within the basement itself and along the laneway.

External (and key internal entry) lighting treatment objectives should:

(i) support (night-time) surveillance at, and as 'spill' along, all points mentioned above in colour temperature 'step' to maximise natural and camera surveillance opportunities
(ii) be consistent with Council's roadway (street) lighting initiatives, proximate to the site
(iii) specify wayfinding lighting at the 4000 Kelvin temperature
(iv) provide 'no gap' wayfinding certainty throughout the basements
(v) continue sympathetic illumination, complementing spill lighting from retail and other ground plane tenancies and amenities.

We recommend LED luminaires (4000 Kelvin). Wayfinding luminaires should be sufficiently beam-angled to maximise throw, spill and (where appropriate) wash, eliminating shadowing and dark gaps while minimising glare. Movement-activated lighting is not recommended for basements as is it leaves most zones in darkness.

Bollards should not be considered for any external lighting within the development.

Landscaping solutions should:

(i) eliminate possible concealment or entrapment within or around plantings
(ii) maximise sightline continuity
(iii) prevent the concealment of suspicious packages, and
(iv) deter potential accidental or 'hostile' vehicle access.

Signage should consider first-time resident-guests, visitor-shoppers, service and maintenance contractors to the site. All signs should be disability inclusive and where practical back-lit. Pictorial signs should be considered.

Inter-disciplinary coordination of these three 'support elements' is essential to enhance the overall safety (security) of the development. DD should detail inter-disciplinary solutions.

CPTED Principle 5 Target Hardening Conclusions and/or Recommendations

From the assessed drawings, we conclude:

We recommend targeted IP Network (CCTV) camera surveillance of the development footprint's vulnerable spaces, covering, as a minimum:

(i) residential entry lobbies
(ii) within the basement at all vulnerable points, including (secured) lift lobbies, disabled bays, recommended help points, stairwells, plant doors and resident storage space

(iii) waste storage and collection points
(iv) entrance doorways to internal plant and external utilities infrastructure
(v) the approaches to retail and amenities spaces.

The determined location of cameras should assist in deterring opportunities for unauthorised access, for concealment or entrapment and with identification.

Help points should be considered for all vulnerable spaces including basement lift lobbies and disabled bays.

For all masonry finishes at ground plane interfaces, anti-graffiti coatings or alternate measures are recommended to minimise graffiti 'tagging'.

From a crime prevention perspective, the above treatments are not 'invasive'. We believe that design development drawings can specify combination solutions without creating a sense of fortressing.

13 Informing Instrument Guidelines and Compliance

13.1 The Department of Transport and Planning

The development comes within the remit of the Department of Transport and Planning, specifically the reporting authority of the Development Facilitation Program (DFP). The project is regarded as a 'Significant Residential Development with Affordable Housing'.

Section 17 of the DFP requirements states that the proposal must:

"*(i) Demonstrate how the development:*

- *ensures that public space is welcoming, attractive and accessible for all.*
- *maximises permeability and connectivity.*
- *maximises the amenity of public spaces in line with their intended use such as through adequate facilities, solar access, shade and wind protection.*
- *maximises street activation.*
- *minimises potential vehicle, bicycle and pedestrian conflicts.*

(ii) Demonstrate how the proposal will be accessible in accordance with the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and relevant sections of the Building Code of Australia 2009.

(iii) Demonstrate how Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles will be integrated into the development."

13.2 The Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning

The Department has issued Urban Design Guidelines for Victoria (2017), part of which is an advisory for public space architecture. Part 3.

Public Spaces Principles, outlines design parameters relevant to this project, The definition of public spaces includes macro, meso and micro spaces where those spaces intersect with streetscapes, other public spaces and built form developments.

Part 3.1.1 outlines a key public space objective to… "*ensure all users have convenient and safe access to and through public spaces*." Public spaces also include communal private space, where the same Guidelines apply. A rationale for this objective is that… "*pedestrians feel safer when a public space has an obvious through-path, with frequent escape routes linking to surrounding streets*."

13.3 Yarra Planning Scheme

The updated Planning Scheme (November 2025) 'guides' and requires developers to consider maximising (CPTED project-relevant) urban design strategies.

"(i) Ensure the interface between the private and public realm protects and enhances personal safety
(ii) Provides a safe and well-lit environment for users of laneways
(iii) Land……. where natural surveillance is desirable
(iv) Maximise internal sightlines to provide for pedestrian safety" (in relation to landscaping)

13.4 Informing Instrument Guidelines and Compliance

Harris Crime Prevention Services' consultants conclude that the Stockland mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood, has intentionally applied, or will apply during design development, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles, as required by the following State and Local Government instruments:

(i) The Victorian Department of Transport and Planning as the reporting authority of the Development Facilitation Program (DFP)
(ii) The Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning's Urban Design Guidelines for Victoria (2017)
(iii) The updated Yarra Planning Scheme (November 2025)
(iv) AS/ISO 31000:2018, Risk Management Guidelines
(v) ISO22341-2:2025 Security and resilience — Protective security — Part 2: Guidelines for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design for residential facilities.

Our consultations with Stockland design teams reassure us that CPTED's welcoming-and-safe-placemaking' objectives will be met.

Harris is further assured that occupancy and operational protocols for the development will confirm compliance with the above instruments in furthering the safety (security) of all occupying and visiting stakeholders.

Subject to continued intentional inclusion of CPTED measures throughout design development-detail documentation, Harris supports development consent.

14 Overall CPTED Assessment Summary

Application of CPTED Principles and Informing Instrument Compliance

In our professional opinion, we conclude that the proposal by Stockland for a mixed-use development at 79-81 Victoria Parade Collingwood Vic., has addressed the Harris-adapted CPTED principles as assessed, affirmed or recommended in this report.

Our conclusions specifically relate to the consultancy's focus on the entry points, ground plane circulation-activation, public/private areas, residential, retail, amenities, the drop-off zone and basement vehicle access and parking, landscaping, lighting, signage, and site-wide 'target hardening' measures to enhance the coordinated CPTED strategy.

We are confident that designing-out-crime measures for residents should ensure their safety and security in relation to ground plane and basement access-egress.

We reaffirm that the development's incorporation of CPTED principles is guided by, or complies with, the Victorian and Local Government urban design and planning requirements.

Harris Crime Prevention Services consultants' are of the view that the development should make a positive crime prevention contribution to the City of Yarra's broader 'community safety' (crime prevention) objectives, in line with Stockland's objectives to deliver a landmark seamless urban living destination and experience that offers flexibility, luxury and security while contributing to the surrounding community character.

15 References

Development Facilitation Program, Preliminary Application Requirements, undated

Stockland, 79-81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood**,** Expressions of Interest Summary Pack, April 2025

Victorian Government Reported Crime Data and Trends, 2016 – 2025

Victorian Government, Department of Transport and Planning, Development Facilitation Program, Preliminary Application Requirements, September 2023

Victorian Government Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning, *Urban Design Guidelines for Victoria, Element 3 Public Spaces,* 2017

Wardle, 79 – 81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood, Urban Context Report, 16th April 2026

Wardle, 79-81 Victoria Parade, Collingwood, Town Planning Issue Updates, 16th April 2026

Yarra Planning Scheme, November 2025

16 Supporting Appendices 1 and 2

APPENDIX 1 CRIME STATISTICS FOR THE SUBURB OF COLLINGWOOD

Criminal incidents and rate per 100,000 population by principal offence and local government area

To view notes about the data presented, hover over the * symbol. *

Data are also available for Offence Subgroup.

To view, hover over the Offence Subdivision label to view a + symbol. Click on the + symbol to expand the data.

Select the Local Government Area of interest from the following dropdown filter.

Yarra

Select Criminal incidents or Rate per 100,000 population from the dropdown filter below.

Criminal incidents

		Year ending June									
Offence Division	Offence Subdivision	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
A Crimes against the person	A10 Homicide and related offe..	5	≤ 3	≤ 3	≤ 3	4	≤ 3	≤ 3	≤ 3	≤ 3	≤ 3
	A20 Assault and related offen..	682	788	798	830	919	932	942	986	849	1,130
	A30 Sexual offences	118	120	166	139	180	163	146	166	143	184
	A40 Abduction and related off..	12	12	6	9	11	8	7	7	11	11
	A50 Robbery	77	107	107	122	142	86	78	61	87	107
	A60 Blackmail and extortion	2	3	2	2	3	5	3	4	5	10
	A70 Stalking, harassment and..	89	122	123	123	129	135	123	123	126	149
	A80 Dangerous and negligent ..	31	59	53	57	40	60	54	70	41	57
	Total	1,016	1,213	1,257	1,284	1,428	1,391	1,355	1,419	1,264	1,650
B Property and deception offences	B10 Arson	20	35	31	23	23	27	13	25	27	41
	B20 Property damage	920	926	1,028	874	890	1,024	824	978	1,120	1,274
	B30 Burglary/Break and enter	1,212	1,278	1,148	948	995	830	740	972	1,159	1,467
	B40 Theft	4,883	4,859	4,609	5,141	4,861	3,603	3,454	4,180	5,302	6,533
	B50 Deception	774	829	900	899	844	689	495	654	652	507
	Total	7,809	7,927	7,716	7,885	7,613	6,173	5,526	6,809	8,260	9,822
C Drug offences	C10 Drug dealing and trafficki..	97	104	99	92	148	103	77	71	85	66
	C20 Cultivate or manufacture ..	20	11	10	6	9	15	6	21	22	32
	C30 Drug use and possession	304	287	261	267	380	274	257	248	221	220
	C90 Other drug offences		1		1	1		1		2	1
	Total	421	403	370	366	538	392	341	340	330	319
D Public order and security offences	D10 Weapons and explosives ..	261	273	232	235	267	247	183	189	218	212
	D20 Disorderly and offensive ..	457	450	447	431	343	243	182	189	94	96
	D30 Public nuisance offences	35	39	56	53	45	32	34	57	55	93
	D40 Public security offences			1	1	1	3			1	
	Total	753	762	736	720	656	525	399	435	368	401
E Justice procedures offences	E10 Justice procedures	81	81	101	86	111	98	92	116	127	126
	E20 Breaches of orders	644	728	709	620	770	744	725	805	742	604
	Total	725	809	810	706	881	842	817	921	869	730

APPENDIX 2 THE RISK MANAGEMENT STANDARD

While there are no absolutes or guarantees around risk and risk mitigation, the International Standard - ISO 31000:2018 provides a helpful framework to identify and manage *any* organisational risks, including crime risks.

Identifying and mitigating crime risks is a legitimate application of the Standard. The Standard provides a theoretical and practical framework whereby contexts, risks, levels and consequences can be identified and managed.

The Standard defines generic risk as... "*the effect (impact) of uncertainty on objectives*" (ISO 31000 Clause 2.1). The Standard's objective is to identify and remove or manage the uncertainty so as not to negatively impact on organisational objectives.

Harris has adapted and applied the Standard by defining (crime) risks within the **context,** assessing **risk levels** and affirming and/or recommending appropriate CPTED treatment.

The collective term '**risk**' has been more widely defined as: ...'*the likelihood of something untoward happening and the consequence(s) if one or more risks become threats or incidents*.'

Threats and incidents are progressive in their definitions. If risks remain unidentified and untreated (unmanaged), they can rapidly and easily become threats or incidents.
A '**threat**' may be defined as *'unacceptable and escalating behaviour stemming from one or more 'uncontrolled' risks, which if not urgently managed, is likely to lead to harm or damage with negative consequences or outcomes*.'

An '**incident**' may be defined as *'an uncontained threat with likely negative harm or damage consequences*.'

2.1 A (Crime) Risk Management Matrix

CPTED solutions should 'match' the adapted Standard's risk levels and categorised behaviours. Recommendations and/or affirmation of architectural solutions are proposed against this backdrop. This table identifies typical risk levels applicable to this specific development.

Low Level Risks	disturbances, intimidation, and aggressive behaviour towards individuals or groups; graffiti and other minor property damage to the façades or street fixtures, fittings, paving, luminaires, plantings and signage
Moderate Level Risks	escalating intimidating or threatening behaviour leading to assault, and/or damage to personal property; unauthorised access, damage to and/or theft of property from the building, vehicles and/or vehicle theft
High Level Risks	'moderate level' crime risks escalated to intentional (planned) personal harm and /or damage to building facades and structures and/or property including plant and associated utilities infrastructure
Extreme Level Risks	immediate and dangerous threats to people and/or property, including the building and contents, vehicles, and/or nearby structures and/or utilities infrastructure, including bomb threats and hostile vehicle penetration

It is worth reiterating that even low risk levels can have serious consequences if not addressed.